

# Operation Motorman



J72

# Operation Motorman Derry City 1972

## By James Bacon

1. [Introduction](#)
2. [The background, as best we can...](#)
3. [One Man One Vote.](#)
4. [NO GO and Free Derry](#)
5. [Planning Operation Motorman](#)
6. [Operation Motorman - The British Forces](#)
7. [Troop Deployments](#)
8. [The Tanks.](#)

[Art by Taral Wayne](#)

9. [Daniel Hegarty](#)
10. [Seamus Bradley](#)
11. [Claudy](#)
12. [The first casualty of War is truth. A litany of lies.](#)
13. [Tactics, Strategy, History and Thoughts](#)
14. [Death Toll July 1972.](#)
15. [Yet where is the learning?](#)
16. [Reflections.](#)
17. [And final word now to John Hume, who spoke to the BBC on the day](#)
18. [Enditorial](#)
19. [Works and Books](#)

Appendices

[Appendix i: Summary of Key Dates and Unit Deployments](#)

[Appendix ii: Deaths in July 1972](#)

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# Journey Planet #72

# 1. Introduction

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1972 was a bad year for Northern Ireland. The year started appallingly, with what is known now as Bloody Sunday, and the killing of civil rights marchers by British forces<sup>i</sup>. This is perhaps the most well known aspect of that year. Thirteen people died that day, but in 1972, just one year of the Troubles, some 496 people were killed<sup>ii</sup>, among them 251 Civilians, 151 members of the Security Forces and 85 Par-amilitaries.

Derry, Belfast and a number of other towns had no-go areas - neighbourhoods no longer under the control of Britain - which neither the police nor the Army could access, and following a sequence of events British forces were sent in to remove barricades and reintroduce British rule. Ostensibly this might make sense; civil laws and rules should apply to all. But in Derry the rule of law was used against people in dreadful ways, and those who made the law, broke it and hid it. Nevertheless, the no-go areas, which frustrated the police and army, were to end.

This military action was called Operation Motorman and saw an amphibious landing of tanks and armoured cars in 'peacetime' and took place on 31 July 1972.

Operation Motorman is the focus of this fanzine (an amateur publication, written and edited by amateurs, but to a decent standard in the spirit of Amateur Press), and my interest began many years

ago, around the use of tanks on civilian streets. While this aspect is explored, I soon found more avenues to explore and have done my best to cover the events of the day, including the subsequent bombing at Claudy.

First we must remember that on the day in question, 31 July 1972, there was a tragic loss of life of ten civilians, and one unarmed IRA man, running away.



Daniel Hegarty

Daniel Hegarty, an innocent boy of fifteen who 'posed no risk', was shot twice in the head during the Operation and was killed, and his cousin was also shot in the head but survived. To be clear, it was found that despite a previous investigation and inquests that Daniel Hegarty and his cousins - who were with him when he was killed - posed no threat to the soldiers, that they were not armed, and that Daniel Hegarty was shot at close range with no warnings given before the shots

were fired.<sup>iii</sup>

Seamus Bradley was running across Bishop's Field; he was nineteen and he was indeed a member of the IRA but he was unarmed. He was seen by soldiers as they entered a field in their Saracens, and a soldier got out and shot him as he was running away from them. He posed no risk, had no gun and the fact he was in the IRA is no justification for his killing. He was innocent.

Later in the day at 10.15am, without warning three car bombs went off in the nearby town of Claudy. Nine civilians were killed, including five Catholics and three Protestants in this country town of 400 people. Further pointlessness and deaths of innocents.

There is so much to understand about the 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland, and so much that is still to be learnt, even twenty-five years after the signing of the Good Friday agreement. My own interest was trying to comprehend why Centurion tanks, albeit those of the Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers, would be utilised in what was effectively a civil situation, and how deploying them was indicative of a wider failure to manage a political situation well. As I read more, it became clear that at so many junctures there were political failures, an inability to be fair, pure discrimination mixed with a deadly egotistical exceptionalism and jingoism of the worst kind. Meanwhile bitter hostility had festered and people were sick and tired of being put upon in undemocratic and appalling ways. Deadly murder ensued.

Universal Suffrage did not exist in Northern Ireland until 1969. Up to then plural voting occurred for local government and for the Parliament of Northern Ireland. Ratepayers and their spouses could vote, company directors had an extra vote, and non-ratepayers (tenants) did not have a vote in local government elections. University representation and the business vote continued for elections to the House of Commons of Northern Ireland until 1969, and incredibly this saw inequality allowed to occur, as effectively Unionist politicians won the 'vote' in nationalist areas.

To be clear here, individuals could vote multiple times while others, the poor, were disenfranchised and had no vote. This is not democratic or fair. In 1969 "one man, one vote" was a serious matter until the Electoral Law Act (NI) of 25 November 1969.

The image of tanks rolling down a civic highway is poignant, loaded with emotion and utterly reprehensible; in civil use it is the vehicle of authoritarianism, of oppression, imposition of dictatorship or of the failure of democracy and decent government, whether it be Budapest on 24 October 1956, Prague on 21 August 1968, or Tiananmen Square in Beijing on 5 June 1989 and most recently in Ukraine. We know there is something fundamentally wrong when we see tanks in a civic situation. Operation Motorman with Centurion tanks rolling down the suburban roads of Derry look so out of place, unreal and unconscionable.

It feels unimaginable, however the loss of life is the most tragic, and for those on that day, there is nothing one can say.

Should any reader have quibble, query, correction or want to suggest an improvement in data or detail, fact or what they witnessed these are welcomed to [journeyplanet@gmail.com](mailto:journeyplanet@gmail.com)

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- i Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry; Lord Saville <http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/>
  - ii *Lost Lives The stories of the men, women and children who died as a result of the Northern Ireland Troubles*. Edited by David MCKittrick, Seamus Keltas, Brian Feeny and Chris Thornton. 1999 Edinburgh, Mainstream Pub.
  - iii Historical Enquiries Team NI Review Summary Report concerning the death of Daniel Hegarty

## 2. The background, as best we can...

Derry is known as Derry/Londonderry/Doire. Officially, all three names work as postal identifiers, with the postcode after it. Doire in Irish means 'Place of the Oaks' and was the location of a monastery founded by St. Columcille.

Derry as a city was established in 1600 and there was a charter granted to City of London companies in 1613 to develop it, and so London was added as a prefix. The city had a wall put around it at this time, and this wall still exists. It is about a mile long and there were four gates into the City that lead to the City Centre point known as 'The Diamond' although another three gates were added later. When King James II and his 'Jacobite' Catholic army went to storm the city, thirteen apprentice boys ran out and locked the Bishop's Gate. Thus a 105-day siege followed, with William of Orange's forces being steadfast in their "No Surrender" defence.

For the next three hundred years even the name of the city was divisive until 1994 when the Partnership for Peace and Reconciliation, seeking to find a peaceful path after the paramilitary ceasefires, found an agreement that satisfied everyone, with Derry/Londonderry/Doire becoming the official name.

Derry is the second city of Northern Ireland, and the fifth largest on the island of Ireland. Ireland had been partitioned after the War of Independence with the signing of the Anglo-Irish treaty in December 1921. Ireland became a 'Free State' with control over twenty-six counties, with six counties falling under the jurisdiction of the British-formed Parliament of Northern Ireland. This led to a split in Irish politics and a Civil War in the Free State of Ireland ensued from June 1922 until May 1923. The fighters who won independence now turned on one another as Pro and Anti treaty sides went to war, losses including civilians are reckoned to be 1,600 deaths. The civil war ended, the pro treaty side won, but really Ireland had lost, lost good people, lost its way in the politics of negotiations that led to it, lost the dream of an independent island.

The treaty provided for a boundary commission to look at adjusting borders, and during 1924 and 1925 they met, their report was leaked, and then after outrage, suppressed, but this exercise then never came to fruition. This was, in my view, disastrous. The Northern Ireland border could be adjusted to contain a vast majority of Protestants, instead in 1926, 34% of the population in Northern Ireland were Catholic<sup>iv</sup>.

Derry, a predominantly Catholic city, was in Northern Ireland and despite recommendations being made to the Irish Boundary Commission to cede Derry in whole to the Free State or use the River Foyle as a new border, these recommendations were never enacted. Today the percentage of Catholics in Derry stands at 74% with Northern Ireland at 43%. At that time of the boundary commission in 1920's it was closer to 90%.

Northern Ireland had a devolved government from 1921 until March 1972. Law and order, local government, agriculture, education and industry were controlled from Stormont. Tax, foreign affairs and defence powers were retained by Westminster, rather like today, at least when the current Good Friday Agreement and Stormont government are working.

The level of sectarianism in Northern Ireland was incredible, and Derry bore the brunt of the discrimination. In 1963 there was a need for more third level education, and a process to find a new university for Ulster was initiated by the Government. Despite the Committee for a New University for Derry getting cross community support, the Northern Ireland government worked the vote and the University of Ulster opened its doors in 1968 in the majority Protestant town of Coleraine, a small town thirty miles away.

This was one of many government decisions that ran Derry down. The Benson Report on Railways from 1963 wanted to close nearly all railways in Northern Ireland except for commuter lines around Belfast and also reduce the main line to Dublin to single track. This brutal approach was slightly lessened and Derry, with its two railway lines, saw the loss of the Great Northern Railway (GNR) lines, and thus travellers wishing to get to Dublin had to go on a very long route east and south to Belfast first.

The 1964 Matthew report saw Portadown chosen as the 'New Town' in Northern Ireland, while the Wilson Plan of 1965 favoured the east side of the province, the River Bann seemingly forming a line where west was worse off. Then in 1966 the British Naval Base in Derry was closed.

The civil rights movement in Derry grew because of this unadulterated discrimination.

iv An excellent explanation of partition can be found here: <https://www.rochester.edu/newscenter/partition-of-ireland-explained-477342/>

<https://www.rochester.edu/newscenter/partition-of-ireland-explained-477342/>



### 3. One Man One Vote.

"In the half century of Northern Ireland's existence, the Catholic minority had been subject to various kinds of discrimination as Unionists took steps to protect their power – most notably by manipulating public housing. Only ratepayers or householders were eligible to vote and successive unionist politicians were reluctant to build houses that would grant suffrage."<sup>v</sup>

"Some of the most obvious examples of "gerrymandering" were found in Londonderry where in the mid 1960s the shape of the council wards deliberately divided the Catholic population to massively exaggerate the political representation of the Protestant community."<sup>vi</sup>

John Hume, upon his election to the Northern Ireland House of Commons in 1969, said of the controversy over the Ulster University going to Coleraine "To me that is where all the present trouble started because that brought the awakening of the public conscience."<sup>vii</sup>

Coleraine had a population of 15,753, Derry had 86,259<sup>viii</sup>.

Derry had it tough. For Derry, with the 'swinging sixties' in Britain and the new luxuries of life that were being experienced elsewhere, this was 'pipe dream' stuff. In Derry it was about survival as people were ground down mercilessly, with political discrimination and colonial structures working 'civil society' against the people. Despite the Derry Housing Committee and Northern Ireland Civil Rights movements, change was slow and hard-fought.

Derry has the River Foyle dividing it, giving us the City Side to the west and the Waterside to the East. On the north west side of the river there is the Old Walled City and to the west of this were The Bogside and Creggan. To the south east of the Walled City was an enclave of Protestant residents in an area known as 'The Fountain'. The Waterside was mostly Protestant.

On 5 October 1968 a peaceful march in Derry seeking fairness in housing, jobs and votes was confronted violently by the Royal Ulster Constabulary with batons, resulting in riots. This was a starting point for 'the Troubles'. The housing protest in Derry was a crucial event in Northern Ireland's civil rights movement; as a planned parade by the Derry Housing Action Committee (DHAC) with the support of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) it protested at the allocation of houses, jobs and the limited franchise in local government elections. When the march had been announced, the Apprentice Boys, a Protestant organisation, declared that they would also hold a parade on the same day, so on 3 October 1968 the Stormont government banned all parades. The following day, all of the organisations behind the civil rights protest met and decided to go ahead with their parade. When the RUC blocked the intended route of the march and baton-charged the civil rights crowd, the television cameras were there and the images were shown around the world, and this civil rights march is often cited as the start of 'the Troubles'<sup>ix</sup>.

On April 19th 1969, nationalists held a rally at the Guildhall and were attacked by stone throwing loyalists, the police intervention was to drive the nationalist crowd back into the Bogside, and then enter the house of Samuel Devaney on William Street, beating him mercilessly in the head, and also attacking his daughter. He had a heart attack a number of days later and then died on 17 July from another heart attack<sup>x</sup>.

A wrong had occurred here, and 15,000 attended Seamus Devenys funeral. How could people exist with such lawlessness from Government forces. No justice occurred.

The Battle of the Bogside, a three day, ongoing street battle between police and protesters from 12-14 August 1969, saw the introduction of the Army

to Northern Ireland. This occurred because the Loyalist Apprentice Boy march was planned to go past the Bogside and locals objected to the triumphalism of Loyalism. The Irish Army set up field hospitals near the border and the Irish government called for a United Nations peacekeeping force to be sent to Derry.

On 14 August the Army went into Northern Ireland and the Police withdrew from the Bogside, however the Army found they could not go everywhere; thus the creation of the 'no-go' areas.

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v BBC News Website [http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/northern\\_ireland/understanding/events/civil\\_rights.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/northern_ireland/understanding/events/civil_rights.stm)

vi BBC News website. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/northern\\_ireland/understanding/events/civil\\_rights.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/northern_ireland/understanding/events/civil_rights.stm)

vii Northern Ireland House of Commons, Debates, 5 March 1969

viii 1971 Census <https://www.nisra.gov.uk/sites/nisra.gov.uk/files/publications/1971-census-towns-villages-booklet.PDF>

ix RTE Archives <https://www.rte.ie/archives/exhibitions/1031-civil-rights-movement-1968-9/1034-derry-5-october-1968/>

x *Irish Times* <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ruc-officers-may-not-face-disciplinary-action-over-derry-attack-1.330560>RUC officers may not face disciplinary action over Derry attack  
<https://www.rte.ie/archives/exhibitions/1042-northern-ireland-1969/1047-growing-tension/320379-funeral-of-samuel-devenney/>



## 4. NO GO and Free Derry

The breakdown of civil society has two parts to it, the authorities and the people. Democratic deficit, oppression and subjugation will result in civil unrest. When relationships and trust gets to a level where simple human rights are in question, it is no surprise that in the vacuum of legitimate leadership, others will step in to lead people. When civil activism and protest seeking just and fair treatment is met with violence and discrimination, civil defence is the natural solution.

There had been a history of 'no-go' areas in Derry, around the Creggan and Bogside housing estates.

On 6 January 1969 'Free Derry' was physically and psychologically created, an area controlled by the community to defend against the unwanted attentions of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and effectively preventing them from policing the area, protected by barricades erected by residents with clubs to hand. This lasted a few days. "You are now entering Free Derry" was painted on a gable end of a terrace house at the junction of Lecky Road, Rossville Street and Fahan Street. It still stands today and has been adorned with some wonderfully poignant murals over the years. During the August riots in 1969 there was an impressive level of industry, from petrol bomb factories to 'Radio Free Derry' while the RUC used CS gas for the first time in the UK. The RUC eventually withdrew due to the resistance of the neighbourhoods.

The Derry Citizens Defence Association held the area, denying access to the Army. By October 1969, Military Police were allowed in. The political situation was not good, and there was a split between the Provisional and the Official IRA. As reported by the BBC on 8 July 1971:

"Two men have been killed by the British army in Londonderry, Northern Ireland. Some of the worst violence in the town for three years flared up this afternoon when a crowd of 200 gathered in Lecky Street at the news of an

Army shooting earlier in the day. Welder and former boxer Seamus Cusack, 28, died in Letterkenny District Hospital of a gunshot wound. Troops opened fire, initially with rubber bullets and CS gas, but they failed to disperse the crowd. The rioters retaliated by throwing three nail bombs. The Army returned fire. One man was shot in the stomach and five soldiers are reported to have been injured by the missiles; the man was dead on arrival at hospital. He was identified as 19-year-old George Desmond Beattie of Donegal Street, Bogside.'<sup>xi</sup>

On 21 and 22 July 1971 Labour peer Lord Gifford chaired an unofficial inquiry in which the MoD (Ministry of Defence) refused to participate. It concluded that neither man was armed.

Imprisonment without trial, known as Internment, was introduced on 9 August 1971. In Operation Demetrius 342 people were seized and imprisoned, and with this barricades were reintroduced around Free Derry. Is that a reasonable action, one might ask.

On Sunday 30 January 1972, more absolute murder occurred, and 14 civil rights marchers were killed. In 2010 David Cameron, leader of the Conservative and Unionist party and the British Government said:

"There is no doubt, there is nothing equivocal, there are no ambiguities... What happened on Bloody Sunday was both unjustified and unjustifiable. It was wrong... the first shot in the vicinity of the march was fired by the British Army... none of the casualties shot by the soldiers of the support company was armed with a firearm.... some of those killed or injured were clearly fleeing or going to the assistance of others who were dying... none of the casualties were posing a threat of causing death or serious injury or indeed was doing anything else that could, in any view, justify the shoot-



ing... on behalf of the Government, indeed, on behalf of our country, I am deeply sorry." <sup>xii</sup>

That apology took thirty-eight years with no shortage of denial, cover up and lies, throughout that period, be it the actions of the BBC on the day, accepting without any query what they were told by the Army, or those of Lord Chief Justice Lord Widgery who led the 1972 'inquiry'.

The actions of 1 Parachute Regiment, resulting in the killing of thirteen unarmed civilians and the subsequent death of a fourteenth, did everything to worsen matters and deepen support and commitment to the IRA. Shortly after this, on the 24th of March, Prime Minister Edward Heath reinstated direct rule from Westminster, suspending Stormont for a year, although this was not reinstated until the Good Friday Agreement over 20 years later. The British Government had a policy of trying to keep things calm and were not keen on taking back these no-go areas. Now that all decisions fell to them, it continued.

A ceasefire occurred on 26 June 1972 as the IRA entered into talks with the British government, but these talks broke down by 9 July and the Provisional IRA undertook twenty bombings on Friday 21 July 1972. There were nine fatalities and over one hundred injuries. Whether warnings were given and ignored, or there were hoaxes, or the inundation was too much to manage, is unclear. The tactic worked against the IRA. This was Bloody Friday.

There were many pressures identified at the talks: 'Protestants were becoming increasingly restive, expressing strong resentment against the 'no-go' areas in Belfast and Londonderry' <sup>xiii</sup>

The barricades, which had been dismantled during the ceasefire, went back up but by this stage the situation of no-go areas was frustratingly intolerable to the Army and to the British government. They could not get intelligence – which reads as to intimidate, arrest and interrogate people – as they wanted to. Treatment of people arrested has been well written about although initially suppressed. *The Guinea Pigs* published by Penguin Books in 1974 by John McGuffin detailed some horrendous activities, as outlined on the back of the later 1981 edition 'The Guinea Pigs in the title were fourteen Irish political prisoners on whom the British Army experimented with sensory deprivation torture in 1971. These 'techniques' are now outlawed, following Britain's conviction at the International Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg, but have been exported and used by Britain's allies throughout the world. This book first appeared in 1974, published by Penguin Books in London. It sold out on its first print run and was then abruptly taken off the market following pressure from the British Government.

There were varied views within Derry. A native from the city, who was in the British Army on leave was murdered, causing outrage. Meanwhile a wom-

en's peace movement and the SDLP (Social Democratic Labour Party) were focussed on nonviolent solutions, however the opportunity such situations and groups presented was not capitalised on. Why did the truce break down? Both sides blamed each other, and Bloody Friday offered the British government an opportunity for military escalation.

Army officers had a 'solution' - widely known but lacking political and logistical support - which was to enter these housing estates and restore 'British rule'. Now with recent events, the Army proposed to take military action against housing estates, and accordingly they prepared to retake and hold 'no-go' areas. Major General Andrew Patrick Withy MacLellan explained his frustrations about Derry in 1971:

"There was a general perception that Derry ('the Catholic capital of the Province') was at the root of the problem. The saying was 'it all started in Derry and it will all end in Derry'. It was believed that the only solution was to saturate the Bogside and the Creggan with troops (subsequently done a year later by Operation

Motorman), thus putting an end to the IRA's domination and driving them into the rural areas where they could be more easily dealt with. This could not be done without more troops and these were not forthcoming."<sup>xiv</sup>

The operation, entitled Motorman, was straightforward enough: enter these no-go areas by force, and saturate them with British Forces, search for and flush out terrorists, seize weapons and, importantly, gather intelligence material. It is often referred to as the largest operation by Great Britain since the Suez Crisis. ([https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/operation\\_motorman](https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/operation_motorman))

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xi [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/8/newsid\\_2496000/2496479.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/8/newsid_2496000/2496479.stm)

xii Full statement of David Cameron to Houses of parliament <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10322295>

xiii History of the Corps of Royal Engineers Volume XI 1969-1980 Col Mackintosh IRE 1993 p261

xiv Major General Andrew Patrick Withy MacLellan CB CVO MBE statement to Bloody Sunday Inquiry March 2000 Ref B/B/1209

# 5. Planning Operation Motorman

Major General MacLellan explained what he wanted to do, but there was no political will to send in a serious force to Derry in 1971. This changed with Bloody Friday on 21 July 1972.

GEN 79, a cabinet sub-committee, was set up as a regular meeting after Bloody Sunday in anticipation of direct rule being re-established.<sup>xv</sup> On 24 July 1972 GEN 79 was convened. It is understood that chairing it was Prime Minister Ted Heath and in attendance would be the Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland, the Home Office, Defence, and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, civil servants, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and MI5. It is understood that they discussed the taking of no-go areas after Bloody Friday. Lord Carver, Chief of the General Staff was asked to draw up a paper on operations in Northern Ireland in consultation with Northern Ireland Ministers, William Whitelaw the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and General Harry Tuzo, General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland amongst others.<sup>xvi</sup> Lord Carver said:

“It is important to exploit quickly a situation in which firm and effective action by the Army against the IRA appears acceptable to a wide range of opinion, including a significant proportion of Catholics.”

Carver argued for internment, and the ‘Occupation’ of the Bogside and Creggan in Derry. Dates and resources were set out. It would require three battalions and a troop of Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers for Derry. The plan to occupy Andersonstown and Ballymurphy in Belfast would require more troops. Dates to be avoided included 30 July as it was six months from Bloody Sunday, and 31 July and 2 August were identified.

The catalyst was Bloody Friday, a dreadful act of terror, killing and injuring so many. This was not really a well thought-out strategic move.

Sir Burke Trend, the then Cabinet Secretary, said to Ted Heath that the plan was “designed to take advantage of the mood of public opinion generated by the bombing atrocities of Friday 21 July.”<sup>xvii</sup>

And William Whitelaw, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, said to the SDLP that: “Bloody Friday’ had made Operation Motorman inevitable.”<sup>xviii</sup> In 1973 a history of the British Army said of Bloody Friday: “It was a callous attack which led to Operation Motorman and the definite end of the Army’s low profile approach to security operations.”<sup>xix</sup>

Decisions were being worked through. ‘Operation Folklore’ would have been where a more serious military intervention would have taken place, but it would therefore also be clear that the Government had lost control of events. This gets a mention in government documents at the time though the details are unclear, but it would have been Province-wide suppression and implementation of draconian measures, a form of martial law, whereas Operation Motorman would be a limited operation in Belfast and Derry, with smaller actions in Portadown, Armagh, Lurgan and Newry.

The decision was made and orders issued on 27 July 1972. Lord Carrington the Secretary of State for Defence sent the instruction and orders to the Army. There was a lot of telegraphing to the media, that the no-go areas were a problem or a source of the issue in Northern Ireland, so despite the short length of time there was therefore a preparedness or lack of surprise about the action.

Troops were moved: some 4,000 of them and



this was reported widely. The Ministry of Defence was reported as saying in the *Belfast Telegraph* "Following last Friday the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that nobody could be in any doubt that very resolute and determined action must be taken against those responsible. The extra troops are required to enable this policy to be carried out." <sup>xx</sup> As part of an article asking whether this was the end of the no-go areas, RTE spoke to William Whitelaw on 28 July asking about the 4,000 troops deployment and he said

"...I must see that the Security Forces are enabled to go freely throughout the whole community. And they will be. And if that is to be the case, then I must make it abundantly clear that if they are to be able to move freely then all barricades from wherever they are put up, whoever put them up, Protestant barricades, Roman Catholic barricades all of them, the whole lot, must come down so that the Security Forces can move freely...." <sup>xxi</sup>

Huge troop movements were occurring in armoured vehicles, Ferret Scout Cars, Saladin Ar-

moured Cars, Saracen Armoured Personnel Carriers.

Jack Lynch, the Taoiseach was informed by the British Ambassador to Ireland, Sir John Peck, initially through diplomatic channels but then face to face at 00.30 on the 31 July in Garda Divisional HQ in Cork. NATO, the US President Richard Nixon, the Vatican and the EECG (European Economic Community) were all informed.

It is clear that the military expected the barricades to be mined, and decided to use heavy armour to deal with them. The use of tanks was not desirable for any civil situation, associated as they are, with the likes of the streets of Budapest, The Berlin Standoff, Poland and Prague where tanks were used to oppress people, so the spin was put to officers from the word go:

"These AVRE's were never to be referred to as tanks, lest the politicians be accused of deploying such vehicles in an internal security situation." <sup>xxii</sup>

General Sir Robert Ford gives an insight into the worries and concerns in Whitehall:

"You would be surprised how many people were terrified about Motorman – terrified of it being launched. They all said, "Oh my God!, well have another Bloody Sunday? I never thought we would. I was totally confident and I really mean that. We did it in saturation with four brigades and twenty-six battalions and the plan was made very, very carefully indeed. Now everyone had agreed that Motorman was essential. We had lost control. There were barricades going up everywhere – all over Northern Ireland. We were being excluded from areas, patrols were being stopped because of the low-profile policy. The RUC had given up the ghost. However, our political masters were extremely apprehensive about the operation.

"I briefed Heath, Whitelaw, Carrington, Harry Tuzo and Mike Carver about it. Heath said to me: "General, how many casualties will there be in this operation?" Now I had absolutely no idea at all. I thought Christ! and was very quiet. So he said: "Well, are there going to be a thousand?" I said "Certainly not, Prime Minister!" So then he said "Well, are there going to be a hundred?" and I said "There might be as many as a hundred, Prime Minister." By this I meant about a hundred who would finish up in hospital – on both sides – and maybe ten dead, or fifteen. One problem was our intelligence couldn't tell us if the IRA was going to fight or not, and this was just four days before the operation.'

"Anyway, Heath turned to Carrington and Whitelaw and Mike Carver (Chief of the General Staff) , with Harry Tuzo ( General Officer Commanding and Director of Operations, Northern Ireland) listening, and said: "I think up to a hundred total casualties is politically acceptable, although I hope there will be many less."

"They all nodded and Heath turned to me and said: "The operation is on." One thing that worried me about the operation was that we signalled it coming, but Whitelaw was determined to do it."

"I was rather against it. I was worried that if they knew we were coming in they would snipe or fix some of our soldiers."

"But Whitelaw felt – and he was dead right and I was wrong – that we *must* give the population and the IRA the opportunity to do nothing. Also give the opportunity to the IRA to withdraw over the border, which of course they did." <sup>xxiii</sup>

It had been made clear at various levels, if not abundantly signalled very clearly with reports of troop movements via the press and through connections such as the RUC informing local politicians, that Motorman was to occur, and in deference to this tactic it is fair to say many IRA activists, along with their weapons, left Derry and dispersed towards Donegal, not far away. At its nearest point, the border is just two miles away from the Creggan estate. There was a measure of conflict avoidance going on here, albeit at a senior level, which unfortunately did not trickle down to the front.

- xv covering letter from Ronnie Custis at the Ministry of Defence to Christopher Roberts in Prime Minister Edward Heath's office, 26 July 1972, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked TOP SECRET PERIMETER UK EYES ONLY
- xvi covering letter from Ronnie Custis at the Ministry of Defence to Christopher Roberts in Prime Minister Edward Heath's office, 26 July 1972, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked TOP SECRET PERIMETER UK EYES ONLY
- xvii Memorandum from Sir Burke Trend to Edward Heath, headed GEN 79, 26 July 1972, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked TOP SECRET
- xviii Note of meeting between Sec of State and SDLP 7.20pm 7<sup>th</sup> August 1972 at Laneside.
- xix *The British Army in Ulster*, Volume 1, by David Barzilay, Century Books, 1973, p. 44
- xx *Belfast Telegraph* 28<sup>th</sup> July 1972 4,000 extra troops may mean no-go area action
- xxi *RTE news* 28th July 1972
- xxii *HMS Fearless the Mighty Lion* Col. Ewen Southby-Tailyour Pen and Sword 2006
- xxiii Gen Sir Robert Ford MBE Statement Bloody Sunday Inquiry Ref B/B1123

# 6. Operation Motorman - The British Forces

“There was a tremendous escalation of violence between when we arrived in 1971 and when we left in 1972. When we first arrived, I would walk around without a flak jacket or a bodyguard and would speak to the people. By 1972, if I had done this I ran the risk of being shot dead. In July 1972, a Company went into the city on Operation Motorman. Six battalions and tanks brought across from B.A.O.R. [British Army of the Rhine] as obstacle removers went in. So, in a period of eighteen months we went, in a city in the UK, from me walking around saying "hello" to people to six battalions with tanks going in onto the streets.”

– Major in command of A Company, the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Green Jackets ("2RGJ").xxiv

## Troops

Terminology is important, a battalion is about 500 to 1,000 men. In the period before Operation Motorman there were 17,000 British soldiers and 9,000 Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) soldiers, a part time locally sourced force, in Northern Ireland. The UDR had eleven battalions; it was formed in 1970 and lasted until 1992. A further seven battalions of 4,000 soldiers were deployed to Northern Ireland<sup>xxv</sup>, : the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards, from Chelsea in London; the 1st and 2nd Battalions Parachute Regiment, from Aldershot; the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, from Edinburgh; the 1st Battalion Royal Green Jackets from the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR); the 1st Battalion Queen's Own Highlanders and the 2nd Battalion Queen's Regiment, also from BAOR.

The Paras were extremely contentious, having shot protestors on Bloody Sunday in Derry earlier in the year and so were deployed away from Derry at the last minute. The Coldstream and Scots Guards were deployed to Derry.

In Derry, Operation Motorman was commanded by Brigadier MacLellan.

The plan was to saturate the area with troops in armoured personnel carriers, seal off the area, remove barricades, build and establish bases, check-

points, such as St. Peter's School, target particular individuals thought to be terrorists, seek them out and search every house, and seek 'intelligence' or as I have noted, intimidate, interrogate and coerce civilians. Into this was brought General Ford who was also very active on the ground.

MacLellan was in charge of 8 Infantry Brigade formed of a number of battalions: 1 King's Own Borderers; 1 and 2 Royal Scots; 2 Royal Green Jackets; 3 Royal Regiment of Fusiliers but added to this were contingents of many other regiments. The Policy Legacy FOI Team Headquarters 38 (Irish Brigade) released an FOI (Freedom of information) document FOI 2019/03518 on 16th April 2019, regarding regiments billeted at St Joseph's school and the identify of the regiments which provided security in the Creggan estate. The FOI of 25 pages of information is fairly detailed.

I note there are some discrepancies between this FOI data and various histories such as 'Operation Banner' or the histories of regiments, such as in *Lions and Dragons (Kings Own Royal Border Regiment 1959-2006)* and this should be borne in mind. As I try to be as accurate as I can be, I am always happy to hear of corrections or witness details that can help improve the record we collate here and we can adjust future iterations.

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xxiv INQ 2079 statement to Bloody Sunday Inquiry, *Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Vol. VIII. C/C\_2079*

xxv *Irish Times* 1<sup>st</sup> August 1972 British Army home depots are quiet.



# 7. Troop Deployments

## 1 Kings Own Borderers

The 1 Kings Own Borderers were deployed to Northern Ireland on the 14th January 1972 for an 18-month residential tour as Province Reserve Battalion, based at Abercorn Barracks, Ballykinler, Co. Down. 'An inkling of the operation came in early July when the battalion learned that it was to receive 12-ton Saracen Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) to replace their Humber 'Pig' APC. When they arrived on 20 July, most were painted in desert sand, sold to a North African country and then after shipping, rerouted to Northern Ireland. 'The troops had three days to learn, practice and be perfect by midnight on 28 July' <sup>xxvi</sup>

The journey from Ballykinler began on the 30 July to the Dave Goulding factory outside Derry. The area was enclosed by the Westway, Beechwood Ave, Greenwalk, and Dunree Gardens, a Saracen would be at the end of each street with Lancers on the Rath roundabout. "The Recce Platoon departed to Fort George for the AVRE, moved it to Foyle College Park... the Battalion rose at 0115 hours ready to depart at 0200 for Foyle College, it crossed the start line at 0400." <sup>xxvii</sup>

"11 Platoon C company worked its way up Greenwalk due to the barrier on Westway at the junction with Beechwood Avenue. This was demolished by a Centurion AVRE, supported by B Company. By 0430 hours the area was cleared of barriers and platoons were in place. No resistance was encountered and there were no casualties. The Battalion continued to operate in the area until 5 August, when it was relieved." <sup>xxviii</sup>

## The Royal Scots

The Royal Scots were deployed for "Operation Motorman in July/August 1972 when the Battalion was on a short-notice emergency tour and deployed to the Creggan Estate of Londonderry for the Operation itself", says the Royal Scots website. There is little detail to be found in histories of the regiment, and for

good reason. The two tragic fatal killings of civilians on the day, occurred at the hands of Royal Scots soldiers.

Lt. Col. R.P. Mason, 1 Royal Scots stated that "In the very early hours of the morning, we set off in Battalion convoy having been ordered to a rendezvous point at Drumahoe. We were all tense, nervous and excited and it was quite like I imagine the night before D-Day was for the troops who stormed the Normandy beaches. It was an amazing night/morning and as the 2IC for 'C' Company I (had) much to prepare... After all the hype and prep and the nerves, the whole thing was much of a non-event...we had no serious casualties. One IRA was shot that day somewhere in our area, although I am unsure as to by which regiment." <sup>xxix</sup> An intriguing statement.

Seamus Bradley, was shot dead running through Bishop's Field, a green in the Creggan estate. Private Alan Jamieson of The Royal Scots reported shooting Bradley at the time. Jamieson and Colour Sergeant Bryden concocted a story, about Bradley being spotted, armed and up a tree, that being confirmed by the Colour Sergeant, his being shot and falling.

They alleged they were Support Company, who had taken up position behind a hedge at No.3 Linsfort Drive in Creggan.

Seamus and his brother Daniel were in the IRA. They had gone to a house near Central Drive where nailbombs were, but it was judged that Seamus was unarmed when he was shot, running across Bishop's Field as Saracens drove onto it, running away from soldiers and no threat. The injuries and silence led to much speculation about how Seamus actually died including the accusation of being injured during interrogation. There were markings on his neck and four gunshot wounds. Into the vacuum of lies and silence, speculation occurs. Coroner Judge Patrick Kinney determined that Seamus was killed by a soldier who got out of a Saracen vehicle, dropped to one

knee and opened fire. He said he had not been able to confirm the identity of the soldier.

<https://www.judiciaryni.uk/sites/judiciary/files/decisions/Summary%20of%20Inquest%20Findings%20-%20Seamus%20Bradley%20-%20150819.pdf>

Daniel Hegarty was shot dead running across Creggan Heights when a heavy machine gun was fired at him and other boys. Major David Dickson, who retired in 1983, was a lieutenant in the Royal Scots Regiment at the time of Operation Motorman. He was in command of the foot patrol who opened fire and killed Daniel Hegarty, 15 years of age, and injured Christopher Hegarty. In evidence given to the inquest of Daniel Hegarty's death, when asked by a barrister for the Hegarty family why he as commander involved in the killing of Mr Hegarty had not approached the two victims, Major Dickson said his main concern was that his platoon had engaged fire. Daniel Hegarty was shot dead outside 114 Creggan Heights.

## 2 Royal Green Jackets

The Battalion was in Ballykelly all of 1972, as part of 8 Infantry Brigade. As reinforcements arrived in July, they were given duties in the 'county' but "fortunately better sense prevailed" and they passed that responsibility to another Regiment.

"Even so we were a little disappointed with the task given to us. With some justification we considered that, as the more experienced battalion in Northern Ireland and as the battalion which knew the city best, we should be given the most important task. We hoped for an area of the Bogside or Creggan after the operation as a change from the county. We were disappointed. "A" company... secured a large school on the edge of the Creggan... the remainder of the Battalion secured the Brandywell area of the City."<sup>xxx</sup>

"We had only been there a short while and I remember the early morning move from Ballykelly camp to Ebrington Barracks. Our convoy joined other companies forming up on the main square. One of my memories of this operation was up behind the Creggan in a farm area and it was the first time I had seen a Saladin armoured car. The officer in charge was carrying a Mauser pistol, which he had bought in Germany... I can remember being in a college overlooking the Bogside and Brandywell... we were informed by our Commander that we were to escort the Royal Engineers by Land Rover to various barricades in order that they could rip them down with huge diggers, this happened in the early hours of the morning when it was very dark." "Our barrier loca-

tion was on the junction of Lecky Road and Anne Street. The noise was horrendous at that time of the morning... To conclude, C Company had one of the more difficult tasks; entering the Brandywell area of the Bogside to carry out searches"

Rifleman Tim March, 2 Royal Green Jackets.<sup>xxxi</sup>

"On the actual day, the no-go areas were entered by elements of no fewer than nine battalions supported by a host of minor units...within a very short time of H hour (0400), the Bogside and Creggan were occupied and there were no casualties to security forces or innocent civilians."<sup>xxxii</sup>

One must ask, why the Royal Scots were given a task that they had no preparation for, while the Royal Green Jackets were sidelined despite their experience, and their knowledge of the disastrous actions of Bloody Sunday. Soldiers and officers were present at the massacre and they would have been acutely aware of how badly that went.

## 3 Royal Fusiliers

3 Royal Fusiliers were stationed in Derry city. The commanding officer was Lt Colonel DM Woodford and his Adjutant Captain CF Jackson. Before they were involved in a situation on the 20th July, a Ferrett Armoured Car of "LI was blown up and subsequently there was a gun battle seeing C Company fire 150 rounds. They were relieved by 2 Scots Guards on 29th of July, went to Bally Kelly and Magilligan to rest. This was short lived, and upon receipt of 34 Saracens went into Derry as outlined in The Fusilier regimental journal gives a good report about the actions of 3rd Battalion RRF in their December 1972 publication on page 39, 40 and 41 which I quote here from.

"More ammunition was issued and we generally "prepared for battle". At 0130 on the Monday morning, 31st July, we left our rest camps and motored back towards Londonderry. The plan was that the battalion should occupy the Bogside whilst three other battalions took over the Creggan. We were to secure our area by motoring into the Bogside in Saracens and then dismount on certain selected objectives, amongst them the infamous Rossville Flats of Bloody Sunday fame, and the well-known Bogside Inn. We arrived in the Forming Up area on the quay near our old headquarters in good order ready to cross the start line at 0400 hrs. We were greeted with the news that the Vigilant Platoon sent ahead to secure the area, had been fired on by a sniper, so clearly the enemy was aware that something unusual was afoot. Earlier in the evening Mr White-law had warned the citizens of Northern Ireland, in a broadcast, that a major operation

was pending.”

“One of the problems facing us was that most of the roads leading into our area had been blocked by IRA barricades. We had watched many of them being built and knew that they were very formidable obstacles. There were also reports that they were mined and booby trapped. To overcome the obstacles we had Engineer support in the shape of a Centurion tank (AVRE) with a dozer blade fitted in front, and various Engineer tractors. In the event the AVRE made short work of the barricades although not without finally coming to grief on a particularly tough barrier of reinforced concrete near Free Derry Corner. It was several days before this particular obstruction was finally removed.”

“The move-in met surprisingly little opposition and hostility. As we discovered later most of the “hard core” gunmen had fled before our arrival, and were sitting awaiting events in the seaside resort of Bunrana just over the border in the Republic. We ended the day in a variety of accommodation. Battalion Headquarters was established in the Swimming Baths, “A” Company nearby in the Stardust Club, the main ballroom of the Bogside, “B” Company was established in a boys’ school and the Rosville Flats, “C” Company in the Bogside Inn, and then in another school at St Columb’s College to which most of us later moved. Support Company found themselves spending their first night in the local abattoir; B Echelon remained in the country at Ballykelly.”

“...we found hard intelligence very difficult to come by.”

## **2 Light Infantry**

In April 1972 the Battalion began a concentrated period of training for Northern Ireland. This was a standard training package as set out by HQ UK Land Forces. 2LI moved to Londonderry on 19 June and assumed operational command of the Creggan Battalion area from 5 Light Regiment Royal Artillery. Battalion Tactical HQ and Command and administration were based at Fort George. On 20 July while A company removed barricades at the Brandywell, a Ferret Scout car was blown up.

On 31 July the Brigade removed the barricades. “The bulldozers for the operation having landed secretly at the dead of night under the watchful eye of a government minister at the Battalion base in Fort George.”<sup>xxxiii</sup>

The tasks for 2LI were to secure a start line for the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion Kings Own Royal Border Regiment to occupy Rosemount and several critical points within the Creggan prior to H Hour. All objectives were secured on time without casualties.

## **B Squadron Royal Horse Guards/Dragoons RHG/D Blues and Royals.**

In here somewhere were B Squadron of the Blues and Royals, a cavalry unit who used a variety of armoured vehicles. On the 10 July, B Squadron of the Blues and Royals was summoned to their Barracks Gym and informed they would be going to Londonderry. “A four day internal security crash course was instigated.”<sup>xxxiv</sup> The Squadron left for Liverpool on the 17 July, and then to Belfast and to Drumahoe, where they were based for ten weeks. A Squadron had been on ‘Emergency Tour’ in Northern Ireland but were returning for leave in August. On patrol one of their Ferret scout cars hit a mine.

They took part in Operation Motorman. “Coronet Brownings troop led the 1<sup>st</sup> Bn Royal Scots into the Creggan”. This was in a Saladin Armoured Car. “Lance Corporal of Horse Stacey was the first Vehicle into the Bogside.” again in a Saladin Armoured Car. Three soldiers on foot patrol received injuries from a mine, and two were injured when their Saladin was mined. Another Saladin caught fire by accident but with no injuries and the cook staffing the ration truck was allegedly shot at.<sup>xxxv</sup> They left Northern Ireland on the 21 September 1972.

## **1 Royal Welch Fusiliers**

Arrived in Northern Ireland on the 9th March 1972 and stationed at Ebrington Barracks on Roulement Tour for 18 months. ‘In July 1972 they participated in Op Motorman for the clearance of republican ‘no go’ areas in the Bogside and Creggan.

A situation report stated ‘started at 0405 and all lines crossed by 0413’... ‘0428 1 KOB secured north Creggan’ ‘0450 1 RS secured central and southern creggan’ ‘0514 1 KOB remainder of northern Creggan.’ ‘0530 3 RRF secured Bogside’ ‘0545 2 RGJ secured St Columb’s College, moved to Brandywell’ ‘0610 1 RS secured southern Creggan’ ‘07002 RGJ secured Brandywell.’

- xxvi *Lions and Dragons Kings Own Royal Border Regiment 1959-2006* Silver link publishing 2006 Stuart Eastwood
- xxvii *Lions and Dragons Kings Own Royal Border Regiment 1959-2006* Silver link publishing 2006 Stuart Eastwood
- xxviii *Lions and Dragons Kings Own Royal Border Regiment 1959-2006* Silver link publishing 2006 Stuart Eastwood
- xxix *A Long Long War Voices from the British Army in Northern Ireland 1969–1998* Ken Wharton · 2008
- xxx *The Royal Green Jackets Chronicle* 1972 An annual record Vol 7 Jan to Dec 1972 p97 and 98
- xxxi *Bullets Bombs and Cups of Tea* Ken Wharton p 292 and 293
- xxxii *The Royal Green Jackets Chronicle* 1972, An annual record Vol 7 Jan to Dec 1972
- xxxiii *Exceedingly Lucky A history of the Light Infantry 1968-1993* Anthony Makepeace-Warne Sydney Jary 1993 p65
- xxxiv *The Blue and Royal* Vol 1 No. 4. 1973 p. 15
- xxxv *The Story of the Blues and Royals* J N P Watson. Leo Cooper/Pen and Sword 1993 p 238, 237, 240, 241
- xxxvi *The Fusiler* December 1972 pages 39, 40 and 41.



# 8. The Tanks.

## Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers

The Royal Engineers had engaged in front-line battlefield operations and were equipped with 'Assault Vehicle Royal Engineers', a series of armoured fighting vehicles. These vehicles were to protect the Royal Engineers, and were historically tanks. The tanks became a platform for a variety of tasks, so carrying trench filling fascines, carrying engineering stores and equipment, mine clearance, deploying mats, roadways, bridges. The disastrous amphibious assault in 1942 at Dieppe, where tanks could not get off the beach resulted in the design and creation of the AVRE. Initially these were Churchill tanks, with their main gun removed and replaced with a demolition mortar. The AVRE's were updated with time, but in many regards lagged behind or utilised main battle tank hulls and so there were the Churchill III and IV AVRE and then the Centurion Mk 5 AVRE "AVRE 165". This Centurion tank based vehicle was the one that would be used in Derry.

The so called FV4003 Centurion Mk 5 AVRE had a short barrelled demolition gun. It replaced the Churchill in 1963. The 165mm demolition gun could fire a 29kg round. There was a large dozer blade fitted to the front, ample storage attached to the turret and numerous attachments and trailers that could be used for a variety of actions. Centurion AVRE's were deployed in Desert Storm and the story goes that by 1991 they had to leave first, as all the other more modern tanks would soon overtake them.

The Centurion AVRE, was purposely intended to clear the way for British Tanks crossing into the

Eastern Bloc, in the event of the Cold War cooling off. Clearing obstacles, filling trenches, clearing mines, building berms for Tanks to shoot from and carrying trench filling fascines, they were front line machines. They were manned by Royal Engineers, known as Armoured Farmers, by their contemporaries. This was not a weapon for Civil Operations.

The Centurion AVRE is a Tank. There is no escaping what the vehicle is, it is not an armoured car that could be misnamed and there is no ambiguity, it is simply a tank.

Captain Simon Cassells of HMS Fearless was instructed to cease activities in an exercise, and proceed to Gareloch. From there his ship, an amphibious assault ship of some 12,000 tons, capable of docking four Landing Craft Mechanical (LCMs) would lift an infantry Battalion of Scots Guards from Gareloch in Scotland to Belfast.<sup>xxxvi</sup>



This would be followed by the deployment by HMS Fearless of four Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers (AVRE's pronounced Avreys) Centurions directly into Derry, using Landing Craft Mechanical (LCM's) large landing craft capable of carrying armour, as per the official records of HMS Fearless:

"With the receipt of additional signals our part in Operation Motorman began. This required us to transport four armoured bulldozers (known as AVREs) from Scotland to Londonderry. The bulldozers which belonged to the Royal Engineers were to spearhead the removal of the barricades in the "no go" areas of Londonderry"<sup>xxxvii</sup>

On 27 July, HMS Fearless docked at Gareloch, at the Royal Corps of Transport facility at Rhu. Major

Neil Carlier of the Royal Engineers assisted with the planning of the operation. Two reconnaissance teams departed Fearless to look at communications from Ship to Shore, and the best beach head for landing the AVREs.

Royal Engineers from Fort George, assisted the Beachmaster in scouting out the banks of the Foyle, found a site, two miles up from the Foyle Bridge. There was a difficulty with the bank, and the type of trackway being used was suboptimal. The beach was the width of the landing craft.

The location. Londonderry Chart 2486. Position 252 degrees from Pennyburn Light 450 Yards.<sup>xxxviii</sup> The coordinates are specific to naval charts.

On the 29 July HMS Fearless delivered the Scots Guards to Belfast.

Meanwhile, the 26<sup>th</sup> Armoured Engineers Squadron based in Germany as part of the British Army on the Rhine, had been transported first on Trucks and then on the Landing Craft Tank HMAV Audemer, a 1,000 ton vessel to England and then by road to Gareloch. By the 29 July the tanks were aboard the Fearless.

The Fearless was joined by HMS Gavinton, a Ton Class minesweeper, but used as a patrol vessel in Northern Ireland, and together they practised some manoeuvres at Carsky Bay, Mull of Kintyre. The plan was for the minesweeper to follow the LCM up the Foyle. The Fearless set sail for Derry, and anchored some 3.5 miles from the 'Tuns Bank Buoy'. There was a very real concern that the vessels may encounter light arms rifle fire.

"Four LCMs which each contained an AVRE, prepared for their 25-mile journey at night in fog from Fearless down Lough Foyle to a hard (landing) on the outskirts of Londonderry. Weapons were drawn, ammunition issued, and an escort in the form of the minesweeper HMS Galveston was provided."<sup>xxxix</sup>

The first Landing Craft arrived at 23.51.<sup>xl</sup> Note that at this time, despite the fact that Jack Lynch was yet to be informed face to face, that the British Army themselves said at 0700 on the 31 July "the operation began at 4:05am and by 7:00am control over the no-go areas had been secured."<sup>xli</sup>

The vehicles had some distinctive markings. The Royal Engineers had painted 'Royal Engineers' on the flanks of the AVREs and the men onboard HMS Fearless had also applied their crest. The demolition gun had been spun around and lowered. This was then covered with a tarpaulin and tied down. The baskets usually at the rear of the turret were removed, and this gave the turret the appearance that it was unarmed.<sup>xlii</sup>

General Ford illuminates further (when he says Avery he means our Centurion AVRE). Despite

his Staff rank at the time, he was in on some of the action on the day:

"I went to Londonderry on that, too. I was perfectly certain Belfast would be alright. I was a little apprehensive about Londonderry. We had eight battalions there. And we had the Averys there - four of them - they'd been brought on a very secret, roundabout route. They were there to remove some of the bigger barricades which our intelligence said were mined.

"Mines lay in them - so there was no other way of getting rid of them quickly, meant they had plenty of time to build these barricades. Now I know Londonderry intimately - I'd been there in peacetime. I was with my ADC and my wireless operator on the corner, just by the start line, all ready for H hour at five o'clock in the morning. The King's Own Royal Borderers were the battalion going in behind.

"H Hour came so-GO.

"The Avery rumbled off. He came to the first corner and was supposed to demolish a barricade turn left and go on and demolish another. But there was a street straight ahead and the bloody man - a sergeant - went straight on. No need to because another battalion was going to deal with that street. I raced after him and caught him a short way up the wrong street. Now he was closed down - he had to be because he was expecting explosions from the mines. I climbed up on the tank and hammered on the top and in the end the chap opened up a little, wondering who the hell was on top of his tank. Then he saw me!

I said "You bloody fool, you've gone the wrong way. You're already ten minutes late."

By this time we were expecting to put twenty-six companies simultaneously into the area. Now of course the Averys and their crew only arrived the previous night and they had been briefed off a map. This driver had to do maintenance on his tank and his sergeant was by now very worried.

So I said "Right, turn round."

Well, the only way to do that was to back through a garden - not a very good start - so we did this. Then we had the second barricade to hit. So I hide down behind the turret - in case there were mines, and we went through with me on top of the tank.

Then he went on and pulled off the street. I climbed down and the first of the APCs were coming along with the Borderers - and the bloody thing halted.

The others coming behind also halted. I couldn't get any sense out of the leading APC, it was all closed down - so I went on down the road, hammering on the back of each one, until I came to the company

commander.

I said to him "Why are you halted?" and he said, "The leading APC is uncertain where to go".

So I said I'll tell you the bloody way to go. Tell him to advance straight on."

So we went in, with that company, onto the objective, and all dismounted.

Now, this is the interesting story - we all split up. One of the leading Official IRA supporters lived right there on that road, I knew him and he was in his garden. I walked round and went up to him and said "Good morning" he said to me "Christ, you!" I was the first soldier he saw in Londonderry as he came out of his house.

Motorman was an enormous success but I can tell you our political masters were extremely apprehensive. People don't realise that to operate within the law and have success you must have excellent intelligence.<sup>xliii</sup>

- General Sir Robert Ford, Commander land forces Northern Ireland July 1971 - April 1973

Apart from demonstrating an incredible lack of planning and preparation - a General jumping on a tank to direct them - there are some interesting insights here. First, the note about intelligence is marked, no-go areas denied 'intelligence' to the military, and the barricades protected the people. The view of success permeates all military and British political sentiment; they felt it was a success. Ford of course had been in charge of matters during the catastrophic Bloody Sunday, and was the most senior officer on the ground in Derry when the atrocity occurred. He had advocated shooting Young Derry Hooligans (YDH) after a warning in a memo on 7 January 1972.<sup>xliv</sup> Ivan Cooper who led the Civil Rights March in Derry in January said "overall responsibility" should have been levelled at the Army's most senior officer in Northern Ireland at the time of the massacre". He

continued "I saw General Ford in William Street shouting at the troops 'Go Paras, go.'<sup>xlv</sup>

The exact numbers in Operation Motorman are unclear. Ford says 8 battalions, while I have a list of seven from one source and could add The Blues and Royals, while elsewhere it is reported as 5 battalions.<sup>xlvi</sup>

The LCMs had returned to HMS Fearless by 3am. Soon, though, the LCMs were being called back as there was a desire to quickly withdraw the tanks,

once the barricades were down. "By 0700 hours all the objectives had been secured",<sup>xlvii</sup> and by 8am the LCMs were being re-deployed to collect the AVRE tanks. By 1500 the tanks had been recovered, and the LCMs had been berthed in HMS Fearless. To celebrate the success of the mission, there was a small party on the flight deck, with a cake specially made for the Royal Engineers and LCM crews.



Celebratory Cake on board HMS Fearless after Operation Motorman

Cake.

There was a Centurion Beach Armoured Recovery Vehicle (BARV) on HMS Fearless, but due to clutch issues it was not used.<sup>xlviii</sup>

Centurion AVREs and a Centurion AVR of the 32<sup>nd</sup> Armoured Engineer Regiment served in the first Gulf War. As previously mentioned, I was informed that the AVREs had to set out two days before the Challenger tanks, so that they would be on time.<sup>xlix</sup> These vehicles were given the title the Antiques Roadshow. Shortly after the victory, the AVREs were tasked with clearing the debris on Mutla Pass, the Basra high road which led to Kuwait City. This was a grisly task, as the road had become known as 'The Highway of Death' with over 700 vehicles destroyed in air attacks.

Since it was found that one of the Centurions had served as Route Clearance in Operation Motorman, the Operation received the title Motorman II.<sup>1</sup>

The Royal Engineers do not record very much about the action. There is a very small paragraph on Motorman in *Follow The Sapper*, along with a photo of an AVRE used. There are about three pages in *History of the Corps of Royal Engineers Volume XI 1969-1980* by Col. Mackintosh (1993) about Motorman and Northern Ireland. As mentioned to me by the archivist working in the Royal Engineer museum when we went looking for further information "Having searched our library database I can find no mention of Operation Motorman in Journals or Corps History, which is surprising," although she kindly allowed me to photocopy what they had.

- xxxvi *HMS Fearless the Mighty Lion* Col. Ewen Southby-Tailyour Pen and Sword 2006
- xxxvii *HMS Fearless 1970-1972*, unaccredited.
- xxxviii *HMS Fearless the Mighty Lion* Col. Ewen Southby-Tailyour Pen and Sword 2006
- xxxix *HMS Fearless 1970-1972*, unaccredited.
- xi *HMS Fearless the Mighty Lion* Col. Ewen Southby-Tailyour Pen and Sword 2006
- xii SITREP ON OPERATION MOTORMAN AS AT 310700a, 31 July 1972, paragraph 9 c, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003
- xiii *Centurion Universal Tank 1943-2003* Simon Dunstan, Peter Sarson Osprey Books 2003
- xiii Gen Sir Robert Ford MBE Statement Bloody Sunday Inquiry Ref B/B1123
- xiiv *Irish Times*
- xiv *The Guardian* 16<sup>th</sup> June 2010 "Savile Report: Commander accountable"
- xivi *Security Forces of Northern Ireland 1969-1992*. Time Ripley and Mike Chappell Osprey Books
- xivii *History of the Corps of Royal Engineers Volume XI 1969-1980* Col Mackintosh IRE 1993 p261
- xviii *Centurion Tank* Bill Munro 2005 Crowood Press
- xiix Retired Senior NCO at RE Museum. Conversation 29<sup>th</sup> June 2010.
- I *Centurion Universal Tank 1943-2003* Simon Dunstan, Peter Sarson Osprey Books 2003





## 9. Daniel Hegarty

15 year old Dan Hegarty was the tragic victim of the most cruel kind, on the morning of 31 July. He was shot dead at 4.15am. The first tragedy of many that day.

He was a boy, shot by a young soldier. And yet fifty years later, there is still trauma, still the seeking of justice, and still unjustness in Northern Ireland. The situation is, a young soldier, (Soldier B) thrown into a hyped militaristic situation, in a housing estate, with limited training and the expectancy of armed terrorists, in the heat of the moment shot two unarmed boys, one dead. It's dreadful.

He had told his Da, that he was going to see the tanks. This resonates with me, and I am sure many others, who would see excitement in military vehicles.

What is worse though is the ongoing 50-year denial of justice. On Tuesday, 8 March 2016, Barra McGrory QC, Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland, gave a statement, and parts of this statement will help us understand the scenario.

"At approximately 4.15am on 31st July 1972 Daniel Hegarty (15 yrs) was shot and killed by a member of an Army patrol on duty in the Creggan area of Londonderry. there is no dispute that the shot that killed him was fired by a soldier who has been identified as Soldier B."

On 17 July 1973 the RUC investigation direction was issued for no prosecution. "Soldier B had made the case at the time that Daniel Hegarty and those with him were armed and posed an immediate threat to Soldier B and the other members of his patrol, and that in these circumstances there was no reasonable prospect that the defence of self-defence could be disproved."

Historical Enquiries Team investigated in 2006. Soldier B said "there was not time to take a properly aimed shot. The weapon was still

down by his side when he fired. He emphasised that events had happened very quickly and that it was his honest perception that he was about to be attacked. Having provided his prepared statement he refused to answer any further questions by investigators in the course of the interview."

The Attorney General for Northern Ireland directed a fresh inquest be held. Ballistics expert Leo Rossi, and Major Dickson gave evidence to the inquest. Soldier A had not been identified and Soldier B was not fit to attend. The inquest concluded on 9th December 2011 and stated

"We believe Daniel James Anthony Hegarty died on July 31st 1972 on the footpath approximately 8-10 feet from the left gate post at (114) Creggan Heights Derry/Londonderry. On the findings of Leo Rossi forensic scientist we believe his evidence contradicts Soldiers B and A's statements regarding the positioning of the gun and the proximity of Daniel and Christopher to the discharged weapon. Our further findings are, Daniel, Christopher and Thomas provided no threat to anyone. We believe no soldier shouted sufficient warnings. After shooting no attempt was made to approach the injured youths or provide medical assistance. "

"The finding of the jury was that Mr Rossi's evidence contradicted statements of Soldiers A and B regarding the positioning of the gun and the proximity of Daniel and Christopher to the discharged weapon. In order to explore fully with Mr Rossi the weight that might be attached to hide evidence in a criminal prosecution and the conclusions that would be drawn from his observations, Mr Frank O'Donoghue QC and Mr Rea (former Assistant Director, PPS) consulted with Mr Rossi. They discovered that he had been supplied with the original statement of Soldier B made in 1972 but not his later statement made to the HET in 2006.



Memorial for Daniel Hegarty on 31st July 1972 by Eamon Melaugh

In this statement made to the Historical Enquiries Team on 06 October Soldier B described the handling of the machine gun as follows: "Dropping to my knee would be the natural thing to do. The machine gun was extremely heavy (at least 27lbs) and would always be fired using the bi-pod" He claimed he placed his GPMG on the ground and he fired it from the ground, but in an un-aimed manner.

"There is no evidence from military witnesses to dispute the account given by Christopher and Thomas Hegarty of what happened immediately after the shooting. Thomas describes being grabbed and dragged by a soldier before being released and told to 'f--k off.' Both Thomas and Christopher are quite categorical that no steps were taken to search any of the three of them or the surrounding area for any weapon or to arrest them."

"Retired Major Dickson made a statement for, and gave evidence at, the inquest. In his statement he recalled hearing frantic shouting from the soldiers and shortly after that he heard the machine gun being fired. In his evidence to the inquest he conceded

that he was not sure whether the shouting was came before or after the shooting. To this extent his evidence is not inconsistent with that of Christopher and Thomas Hegarty but cannot contradict the account given by Soldier B.

"There are a number of inconsistencies between Soldier B's 2006 statement and the contemporaneous account provided in 1972. In his original statement Soldier B estimated that the youths were about 25 metres away when he opened fire. This is not consistent with the location of the blood stains at the scene and in his 2006 statement Soldier B says he believes the distance was less than this and does not dispute that the distance could have been less than 10 feet."

"It is clear that in this tragic case there was no objective justification for the shots fired by Soldier B that killed Daniel Hegarty and injured Christopher Hegarty. Neither Daniel or Christopher posed any threat to Soldier B or his colleagues."

End Statement



# 10. Seamus Bradley

Seamus and his brother Daniel were in the IRA. A nineteen year old man, the Coroner inquest in 2019 gave the clearest insight to his death. Here I use much of what was in that verdict. (<https://www.judiciaryni.uk/sites/judiciary/files/decisions/Summary%20of%20Inquest%20Findings%20-%20Seamus%20Bradley%20-%20150819.pdf>)

Evidence given by Private Alan Jamieson and Colour Sergeant Bryden; They gave an account to the Royal Military Police stating that at approximately 04:45 he saw a person breaking away from a group in front of the Central Drive shops and running to a tree on Bishop's Field some 175 metres from their location.

He said he had what looked like a sub-machine gun in his hand as he ran. After a few minutes, the person climbed the tree. Private Jamieson asked Sergeant Bryden to come to his position and confirm, through the scope on his rifle, that the person was a gunman. Sergeant Bryden confirmed that he was a gunman and ordered Private Jamieson to fire. He reported that

he fired four shots: the first two missed, the third apparently struck the deceased on the ankle as Private Jamieson saw him clutch his ankle, and on the fourth shot he saw the deceased fall from the tree. In his statement, Sergeant Bryden confirmed that through Private Jamieson's scope, he saw a man up a tree wearing civilian clothes and appearing to have a sub-machine gun in his hands. He said he saw two other men standing at the base of the tree. He confirmed that he ordered Private Jamieson to engage the gunman and left him to take control of his section. After



**The Funeral of Seamus Bradley**

hearing a scream he looked towards the tree and saw the gunman in the tree and the two men at the base of the tree were not there anymore.

From the evidence given by Daniel Bradley; Daniel was with his brother Seamus on the morning of 31 July 1972. They attended a house in the Creggan where nail bombs were handed out, but neither he nor his brother took one. They then went to the shops at Central Drive. He thought a nail bomb was thrown at a Saracen and told another man to take the deceased to safety. He said his brother then ran onto the road, paused to make sure the soldiers saw him, and jumped over the fence onto Bishop's Field. Daniel

Bradley then described two Saracens: the first lighting up the field with its headlights and a soldier getting out of a second Saracen, running to the front of it, kneeling down, taking aim and shooting the deceased.

He said his brother lay in the same spot for about five minutes but then got up. Daniel Bradley then claimed a soldier got out

of the first Saracen, knelt down and shot the deceased as he was standing up. A further five minutes passed before the deceased was placed in the back of the first Saracen. Daniel Bradley claimed his brother was screaming and being beaten up inside the Saracen.

He confirmed that his brother was not carrying a weapon at the time of his death. He also said he believed his brother jumped out of the Saracen before reaching the first aid point at St Peter's School and that soldiers had placed an Army belt around his

neck. End Evidence quote.

Daniel Bradley had made a number of allegations over the years. Reflecting on them, and given the coroner's decision, it is not unfair to say that into the vacuum of secrecy and dishonesty, it is reasonable for a person to speculate what has occurred to their brother, his voice is valid and vital.

The coroner's verdict was as follows:

Verdict: The deceased was James Oliver Bradley, more commonly known as Seamus Bradley, of 12 Eastway Gardens in Derry. He was 19 at the time of his death. He was employed as a scaffolder. Seamus Bradley died on 31 July 1972 at a time approximately between 05:15 am and 06:30am. He died in the rear of a Saracen whilst in the custody of soldiers belonging to the 1 Royal Scots Regiment. The cause of his death was laceration of his left femoral artery due to a gunshot wound. That injury amongst others was sustained when he was struck by at least four bullets fired by a soldier of the 1 Royal Scots Regiment. Seamus Bradley was on an open area of ground known as Bishop's Field, Derry when he was shot. The soldier who shot him had got out of a Saracen located on Bishop's Field near the junction of Central Drive and Linsfort Drive, knelt on one knee near the rear of the Saracen, aimed his rifle at Seamus Bradley and shot him several times. The shooting took place at around 05.15am to 06.15am. Seamus Bradley was running across Bishop's Field away from the Saracen and did not have a weapon. He could not reasonably have been perceived as posing a threat of death or serious injury to the soldiers in the Saracen or any other person. The use of force by the soldier was entirely disproportionate to any threat that could have been perceived. The soldier who shot Seamus Bradley did not adhere to the terms of the Yellow Card. The soldier was not justified in opening fire. Seamus Bradley

was collected by the same Saracen and taken to St Peter's school which was a designated aid station. He died en route to that aid station. No first aid or medical assistance was provided to Seamus Bradley by the soldiers. If such aid had been provided then there was a reasonable prospect that Seamus Bradley may have survived the shooting. Seamus Bradley was not mistreated by military personnel in the Saracen in the form of physical assault, torture or shooting. However he was denied even the most basic form of first aid treatment. Operation Motorman was not planned, controlled or regulated in order to minimise to the greatest extent possible the risk to life, principally because of the lack of planning for casualties, both civilian and military. The investigation into the death of Seamus Bradley was flawed and inadequate. END

While Mr Bradley was pleased with the result it was reported that on the 15th August 2019 he said he 'maintained that his brother had been tortured by soldiers and accused the RUC of withholding colour autopsy photos to the original inquest - images he claimed proved ill-treatment.' and to that one can say there is still contention around this killing and he said he 'was going to make a complaint to the Police Ombudsman and raise the case with the Dublin government.'

47 years after Seamus was killed, it beggars belief as to what the hell the soldiers were thinking, all the historians claiming he was a gun man, swallowing what the army said without query, and while the reading of the verdict is terribly uncomfortable and tragic, we must give latitude in regard to his own deductions to Dan Hegarty, who has relentlessly pursued the matter with his family, and whose legitimate concerns were valid and whose outstanding issues with his brother's loss, need to be addressed fully.

The second tragic loss of the day.

# 11. Claudy

Claudy is a town in South Derry, about ten miles from the City itself. You would not know it only for what happened next to this town of 400 people. The atrocity that occurred on the morning of the 31st July killed six people straight away. Three car bombs were exploded in the town, all without warning, the first at 10.15 outside McElhinney's pub and petrol station. The next was outside Beaufort's Hotel at 10.20 and then the next one outside the Post office, at 10.27. The total to die from the car bombs were nine people—5 Catholic, 4 Protestant.

The Provisional IRA has never accepted responsibility for the action. Seen as a reprisal for Mortoman, or an attempt to lessen activity in Derry, by drawing away troops, there was no tactical advantage to this at all. Martin McGuinness said he was furious about it "I was in Derry city at the time of the move by the British army into the city and that was on the same day as the Claudy bomb... I was very angry when I heard that a number of bombs had exploded in Claudy and that innocent people had been killed..."<sup>iii</sup>

The death toll is terrible. Those killed were Kathryn Eakin (9), Joseph Connolly (15) who was on his way to a job interview at Desmond's factory, Willie Temple (16), who was on his first day at work on a milk round, Joseph McCloskey (39), Artie Hone (38), Rose McLaughlin (52) Elizabeth McElhinney (59) David Miller (60), who was assisting the injured from the first blast to the medical centre when he was caught by the second bomb, and he ended up in his own garden and James McClelland (65).

It is important to consider those people, their innocence and loss, before we look at the next awkwardly uncomfortable situation. One might imagine that it would be easy to condemn their murderers and that the police would do everything to find them.

Not at all. The Catholic Church, RUC and British Government conspired to hide the truth. In doing so protecting a priest and those who planted the bombs.

Father John Chesney died in 1980. An un-

known priest, he was unusual, stylish and charismatic, and with a sports car, he struck a very different pose than most priests. He was the curate in Cullion, one of the smallest parishes in County Londonderry, near the village of Desertmartin. He was moved to Donegal and would have remained insignificant except for rumours, only for an anonymous letter from a 'Father Liam' in 2002.

This letter purportedly from a priest in England told of how Father Chesney had confided in him in 1972 at Malin Head about the atrocity he had led, accepting responsibility for the Claudy bombing. Chesney may seem like an unusual choice for an IRA Officer, but he was allegedly Director of Operations of South Derry Provisional IRA. The revelation of the letter, caused considerable consternation in 2002 and The Police Ombudsman opened an investigation.

The report revealed that a person identified as 'A' had a distinctive car which was seen used by those trying to call in a warning. Fr Chesney provided 'A' with an alibi, but the police felt that it was a false alibi at the time.

On 30 November 1972 Police Officer 3 wrote to the NIO stating; 'For some time I have been considering what action, if any, could be taken to render harmless a dangerous priest, Father Chesney, who is leading an I.R.A. Unit in South Derry.....I attach a précis of the intelligence on Father Chesney and suggest that our masters may find it possible to bring the subject into any conversations they may be having with the cardinal or bishops at some future date.....'

And so William Whitelaw the secretary for Northern Ireland, the man who was in charge, appears implicit in the knowledge that a priest was involved in this atrocity.

A former RUC Special Branch detective who said he had wanted to arrest Fr. Chesney in 1972, was told by an assistant chief constable that matters were in hand. That same ACC then wrote to the Northern Ireland Office asking what action "could be taken to

render harmless a dangerous priest". He asked would it be possible to bring the subject up with cardinals or bishops. In December 1972, a NIO official wrote back to the ACC to say that the matter had been discussed by the Northern Ireland Secretary Willie Whitelaw and Cardinal Conway, the head of the Catholic Church in Ireland.

The letter read: "The Cardinal said that he knew the priest was a very bad man. The Cardinal mentioned the possibility of transferring him to Donegal."

The then RUC chief constable, Graham Shillington, said he would prefer a "transfer to Tipperary". Fr. Chesney was moved to a parish in County Donegal in 1973, he died in 1980.

No paramilitary group has ever claimed responsibility for the bombing and no one has ever been convicted of it, but for more than 30 years rumours circulated that a Catholic priest and the IRA were behind the attack. When the investigation into Claudy was re-opened in 2002, part of its remit was to investigate claims that the British government, RUC and the Catholic Church conspired to cover up the activities of the priest.

The Police Service of Northern Ireland said that a search of papers from 1972 indicated that a priest in south Derry had been an active member of the IRA. They did not name him, but few doubted the priest in question was Fr. Chesney. Fr. Chesney may have joined up after Bloody Sunday, but to rend upon Claudy the devastation that would occur, a small rural mountain village amongst the Sperrin mountains and then to learn it was covered up by those in the highest echelons of power, beggars belief.

The police Ombudsman report published of the 24th of August 2010 makes for some difficult reading:

'Extensive police Intelligence received after the bombings details allegations that Father Chesney

was involved in acts of terrorism, including the bombing of Claudy. It also connects him to terrorist activities with Man A, who left the jurisdiction after being arrested and interviewed by police. The Intelligence further identifies Father Chesney as the IRA's Director of Operations for the South Derry Area.'

It continues 'This documentary evidence and historical records supplied by the Catholic Church reveal that the Secretary of State, Rt. Hon. William Whitelaw, and Cardinal William Conway, met on 5 December 1972. The evidence indicates that at the end of the meeting a private discussion, initiated by the Secretary of State, took place between both men, during which the Father Chesney issue was discussed.'

You would think that Cardinal Conway and William Whitelaw might have had some respect for the rule of law, but they not only disregarded it, but worked to undermine and allow others to get away with breaking it. Getting away with murder, is unexpected but obvious here.

Regarding the RUC 'In the absence of explanation the actions of the senior RUC Officers, in seeking and accepting the Government's assistance in dealing with the problem of Father Chesney's alleged wrongdoing, was by definition a collusive act.'

<https://www.policeombudsman.org/PONI/files/2e/2ec3bb8d-f915-48c6-9805-fb742ef894e0.pdf>

On the 31st of July 2012 Martin McGuinness is quoted as saying "The deaths and injuries caused in Claudy on 31 July 1972 were wrong. The events of that day were appalling and indefensible and they should not have happened. All of the deaths and injuries inflicted on totally innocent people in this quiet village 40 years ago should motivate everyone in our society to ensure such terrible tragedies never happen again."

## 12. The first casualty of War is truth. A litany of lies.

Lord Carrington Secretary of Defence said in the House of Lords on the 31<sup>st</sup> July "The information I have about the two that were killed is that one was 19 and the other 16 [wrong], and that one was apparently in possession of arms while the other is suspected of being a gunman."



I find it utterly unconscionable that some youngster squaddie who messes up, catastrophically, is then the single point of guilt and because the system is such, it becomes a cover up to 'protect' them while actually it is about protecting the system. The guilt

of the individual is undeniable, but the responsibility should be shared, owned by that chain of command for their failure.

We cannot give soldiers carte blanche to kill innocent people without consequences, but there is something wrong where everyone knows a wrong has occurred, and no one accepts responsibility and just lie about it for years and years and years. An immediate admission of guilt, a proper trial, and judge and jury led sentence, the matter would be closed.

The army could and should have a system where when something like this occurs, they have a Duty of Care to both soldiers who fall and victims killed, loyalty to one's soldiers should not override the loyalty to the citizens they are employed to protect. Where is the honour, be it Soldier B, General Ford, Willie Whitelaw or Ted Heath.

News was immediately reported that these two boys were 'Gunmen'. Daniel Hegarty had gone to 'look at the tanks', an excited teenager. There was no malice or ill intent.

Like. No. This is clearly a lie.

Put simply there is no evidence to suggest that either boys had guns, that either were petrol or nail bombers, that either posed a threat to the soldiers, that either were suspected of anything, they were shot dead, for no good reason.

No soldier has ever had the courage or honour to stand and simply say – they made a tragic mistake – they were in a stressful situation and they misjudged, or did the wrong thing, pulled the trigger in error or even sorry. Acceptance, remorse, punishment, and maybe forgiveness. But there has been nothing.

No officer has stepped forward to admit they may have given an order to shoot. No officer has admitted that men under their command breached the 'yellow card' Rules of Engagement.

Families who demand and require justice, are legitimate in their desire to see persons tried for that, both the victims of Claudy and Motorman. Families are entitled to that justice and to have seen justice being done. To find closure.

Seamus Bradley was in the IRA, but while he attracted the attention of soldiers and possibly led them away, how was that known, as he ran across a green, away from soldiers to be shot down, and allowed to bleed to death, effectively executed for running away. I would run away myself if two Saracens drove into a green behind me too. Noise of the bloody things.

The Claudy bombing is equally shrouded in dreadful government behaviour, Whitelaw in cahoots with a corrupt Catholic Church hierarchy, only interested in protecting their evil priest with no interest into the long list of things these Catholic religious types preach and pontificate about. I cannot imagine how it is for the families, reading these things.

Both boys were innocent, did not deserve to die at all, but worse still, have been repeatedly maligned and dishonourably treated, from the moment they were killed.

The falsehood is continually perpetuated, so many examples, and it is depressing everytime I read it, for instance in 1993. Col Mackintosh wrote in the History of the Corps of Royal Engineers: "...one gunman and one petrol bomber were shot dead" in regard to Motorman, and it is unfortunate.

I should say though, that in my encounters with historians and publishers, they are keen to do the right thing. I have met lovely people in museums, who only want to understand. Likewise, the 2009 edition of Operation Banner by Nick Van Der Bijl, page 69 states with no further detail 'Two gunmen were killed' and this book was reprinted as paperback in 2017 and then 2021, and so I wrote to Pen and Sword and Charles Hewitt and noted that, it maligns two people, one of whom is a child, and suggest an edit, he replied 'I totally support and agree with you. I will ensure the book is changed at the next reprint... thank you for taking the time to address this important matter' and so I have faith that history can right the wrong, and probably that those reporting, just like me here, are saying what they find in previous publications or was officially said.

Reconciliation is required in these instances, and while I am no expert, lies and more lies fixes nothing.





# 13. Tactics, Strategy, History and Thoughts

When one starts an essay, book, chapter or academic piece, written about the Troubles, an early indicator is what the city is called. Londonderry is a quick give away, if there is no mention of the common use of the city by those living there, as in Derry, and no explanation one gets a hint of bias immediately. The railways, tourist board university and many publications avoid this bias, by using Derry and Londonderry. Draw from that what you will.

Following the official line is easily identified, by the maligning of the two boys killed on the day, identifying them as 'Gunmen' or 'Bomber' is a clear toeing of the line of British Military propaganda, or not having researched sufficiently, or a failure of curiosity and diligence, but it gives one insight then in regard to veracity and integrity of those who are writing.

Added to that, there is a strange belief that Operation Motorman was a success. This utterly challenges my understanding of what success is.

Essentially, strategists consider the ending of the 'insurgency' and driving of the IRA into a different fight to have been a win. I see it as an utterly contemptible failure, with thousands of lives the cost. It must be questioned why Motorman is seen as a success, or a successful end to the insurgency. While it is true that death rates per annum were never as high as in 1972, I continually find it unfathomable that this is then justification for the operation and declaration of a success when so many people would go on to get injured and die in the subsequent 22 years. There is no decent preface, or consideration given to resolving the matter by politics,



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addressing the wholesale mistreatment and discrimination of a population, or a militaristic solution to what was a civil set of issues.

This is rarely mentioned, Motorman was like trying to fix a cracked jar with a hammer, it did not make it any better, just took years to put back together. Operation Motorman in an alternate history, could have been the deployment of the exact same amount of resources, money, government will and logistics, but to support and treat Derry and Northern Ireland equitably and to build back a decent civil society. To face down the bigotry and discrimination of Protestant unionism and open talks, with the British Government recognising how dreadful their agents and supporters were, to work to negotiate and not to torture, harass, interrogate, brutalise, beat, imprison unlawfully and murder people, but to seek a peaceful and meaningful solution.

That is, of course, fantasy.

They sent in tanks instead, it was a success. The cost was unreal, with 3,100 people killed and more than 30,000 injured. Then there is an unwillingness to quantify the financial cost. How much better

off would or could everyone have been if the British Government had recognised their own failure at being fair to their own citizens. There is also no consideration of the failings at ground level, what actually went wrong with the Royal Scots, was it two errors? They did have experience as a regiment previously, but why did the Kings own Royal Border Regiment have no problems or the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. This is not asked. Ever. The Borderers were on long term deployment, they had troops in Derry during Bloody Sunday, but were not in the atrocity that occurred there, but soldiers and officers were in close proximity to that appalling action by the Parachute Regiment. The Borderers knew what happened and saw it go wrong. They were stationed in Northern Ireland for months. Is it unfair to say they may have been accustomed to the country, its people, the pesky children, a runner, a gunman taking aim. The Royal Scots were on an 'Emergency Tour' despite having had tours previously, and they failed. Were they over-hyped; were they wound-up?

## 14. Death Toll, July 1972.

When one reads books mostly published in the UK about the Troubles, one would be forgiven for thinking the Troubles were as simple as the IRA fighting against the British Army.

I have tried to share the complexity of matters, and found that a reading of those lost during July 1972 demonstrates how difficult it is to make such simplifications, contributing in my mind to the flawed view of Operation Motorman. Not only because it misidentifies the issues at hand but it also allows concerns to be brushed aside.

Sixty Six civilians were killed in July. Civilians were killed by the terrorist forces in their own community. Twelve members of terrorist organisations were killed, while nineteen members of the British Army were killed and one RUC person. We have to be careful about assumptions, so for instance a Catholic member of the Army Reserve was killed by loyalists.

Loyalist terrorists killed twenty five people and the British army killed twenty one. Republicans killed fifty people and two people were killed by unknowns. Civilians were the victims, and in July thirty seven of those were Catholic and twenty eight were Protestant.

The Springfield Massacre, Bloody Friday, Operation Motorman and Claudy are all parts of this tragic litany of death.

Suffice to say, it was not as simple the IRA against the British Army.

I must credit Malcom Sutton who steadfastly and stoically compiled a list of those killed in the Troubles, so that they could be remembered and M. Meleugh and the CAIN as vital resources in regard to this list. Details are available here: <https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/sutton/chron/1972.html>



# 15. Yet where is the learning?

From *Operation Banner An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland 2007*:

'The Operation was formally closed down on 1 December 1972. Tactically it had been a reasonable success. It had re-imposed the ability of the security forces to operate throughout Northern Ireland. It had demonstrated that the rule of law would be applied in all places. It had reassured moderates of all persuasions, and PIRA had lost significant face. A large number of terrorists had been detained and interned, but few of the PIRA higher command had been caught. Operationally, however, MOTORMAN was a great success. It was a major defeat for PIRA as an insurgent body. It showed the World that the British Army could operate swiftly, efficiently and even-handedly. It clearly demonstrated Whitehall's determination not to be beaten. Unusually, the British Government's information operation to support MOTORMAN was well-handled and a success.'

Major success and major defeat. It doesn't get any better with time:

*ARMY FIELD MANUAL VOLUME 1 COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS PART 10 COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS (STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES) REVISED AND UPDATED VERSION -*

'After Op MOTORMAN (Northern Ireland 1972) the IRA ceased to be an insurgency whose aims were to get the British out of Northern Ireland. They did, however, remain a serious terrorist threat for many more years that needed to be countered with resolute action by the Government and Armed Forces.'

Sounds successful doesn't it? The talk of insurgency makes one think that this was a one way war, something that needed stamping out, when the cause of the situation rested with the British Government.

*The British Army Review Special Report from Winter 2019 on Urban Operations Vol 2. Urban Guerrillas: Origins and prospects* carries an article by Capt. R.A. Stewart BSc of The 22<sup>nd</sup> (Cheshire) Regt. Originally published in *BAR* 62 August 1979. It stated: 'On the other hand there is a very great danger in allowing so-called no-go areas, such as those of Londonderry in 1972.'

Why? Police had brutalised the people, that is why they created no-go areas. This modern piece of Military literature continues: 'There was a much freer flow of information to the Security Forces after Operation Motorman in August 1972 when the Army re-entered the no-go area of Londonderry.'

Which of course, is well known, the intimidation, violence and interrogation and then internment, imprisonment without due process could continue unmolested. At no stage do we see any challenge to what the Army did, reinforcing the importance of the operation.

Falsely continuing the belief that there is a positive to the militaristic approach, and this making the reader wonder, why is it so hard to accept a tactic was fundamentally flawed and ultimately an approach and route that did not in any way lessen the pain and hurt of all involved.

As I read academic papers which mention Operation Motorman, which are helpful, but sometimes removed and cold and neglecting the loss of the day and perhaps not truly objective, I often find they are concurrently highfalutin and neglectful.

Strategically the strategy Britain had for Ireland was a disaster. Did driving a tank through barricades do anything to cease violence, or find peace? No it did not.

Maybe this is why Britain does not learn from its mistakes, or why I kept feeling like once you get to tanks, killing innocent boys and lying about it, you have already lost.

To the end of 1972, 689 people lost their lives to The Troubles, 20% of the total of 3,500, it really beggars belief that no one thought - Hold on - lets negotiate a just and fair peace here... lets use Bloody Friday to stop the war, rather than escalate it, for a triumphalist win. Was the war against terror won. I don't hear anyone saying now, apart from a soldier involved in the action, that Motorman was the moment the tide turned...

The mindset of those involved, well is questionable, for instance, you can see the frustration here of Gen Robert Ford in the evidence he gave the Bloody Sunday enquiry, and realise how wrong a person he was for this role,

"Then we were reaching a stage - just before Motorman - when morale was beginning to go down. I had to talk to those COs and tell them they bloody well had to get a grip on the situation and were all talking and saying they couldn't go on. This business of going on patrol and having one man shot - Duty Targets - we tried all sorts of tactics in this time between Direct Rule and Motorman. Whitelaw was saying that with Stormont out of the way the main objection to Catholics taking part in politics had been removed - therefore he wanted a low-profile Army while the politicians tried to get things going. One of the things I can remember so well about that time was standing in Andersonstown police station, when Gerry Adams - who was commanding the Belfast Brigade of the IRA, walked

past, leading a procession to Militown cemetery and staring at me. We were twenty yards apart and he and I were staring each other in the eye. All my intelligence told me he was the commander of the Belfast brigade; that he organised everything ... and there was nothing I could do about it. Those low profile times were terrible. I felt they were wrong at the time - definitely. I was against it but Willie Whitelaw was determined to do it, perhaps he was right.<sup>liii</sup>

Unfortunately the talking stopped, and the man who reportedly said 'Go Paras, go' got the land battle he wanted. I contend it did nothing to end the Troubles, and only made it worse.

As a personal aside, at no stage does one see the military minded refer to Bloody Sunday in the same terms, The Springfield Massacre also in July 1972 is often overlooked, and the accusation that Bloody Friday was a manifestation of a failure of negotiations is not made mention of, rather a focus on the terrorists who committed the atrocity. It is fascinating how military strategists overlook the bald truth, but that is a personal view.

It all felt a little surreal, like the reality of the broader learning, that Northern Ireland as a total political situation was utterly mismanaged, and everything from that was always going to be a disaster, was unimportant in the exploration or argument that was being put forward looking at a detail.

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liii Gen Robert Ford. Evidence Bloody Sunday enquiry B1123 <https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20101017071251mp/> and <http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/evidence/B/B1123.pdf>

# 16. Reflections.

Denis Bradley, a former priest and film producer, offers another opinion of the same activities, as you can see he perceived the use of tanks as rather effective. This interview was part of his statement for the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, and here he explained the difference between Motorman and Bloody Sunday, for Jimmy McGovern:

D.B. '... I think the British never repeated the operation. That's what I think the effect of Bloody Sun-

day was. They says there's no fucking way involved in that again. To that, we'll contain it, we'll do this, we'll do that but they even at times changed and sent in the SAS to very specific situations but never, never with the same gusto. And Unionism you see, Unionism was pleading for years that the fucking Brits would go in and do this. And Unionism to this day can't understand why the British didn't redd out the Provos. And when they came in on Motorman they came on a completely different fashion.'

J.McG... Much more organised wasn't it?

n.B... Absolutely

J.McG... With the element of surprise and

D.B... Aye, yeah but it wasn't even surprise they come in with fucking heavy tanks, right. There was very few soldiers on the ground, they just come in way fucking centurion tanks and fucking took up positions and knocked down barricades and sat there in their tanks.

Wasn't much anybody was going to say about that. And that's kind a what happened that day. It was a whole different approach, that's what I think happened.<sup>liv</sup>



There were no mines in the barricades, which the tanks very easily broke through although there were reports of a car bomb and linked mines in the Brandywell getting defused. There is some report that a dozer blade got damaged but that surprises me, as I would have ex-

pected them to be more robust, and I suspect user error or bravado. 'The Barricades were formidable and in one instance almost led to an AVRE blade being sheared off.'<sup>lv</sup>

The Provisional IRA had seen this action coming. As General Ford has already stated, there was a visible effort to let the PIRA know that something very serious was afoot. Ex-IRA man Paddy Ward tells of the situation:

'MOTORMAN (July 1972) The Brits had been threatening to come in for weeks and they did a few little runs up to the barricades before Piggery Ridge. It was the talk of the movement, they had brought all the Saracen armoured cars in from the desert and they were all painted sand colour. At ten o'clock the night before Motorman, McGuinness held a meeting with all the section leaders of the eight men cells and told them to dump all their weapons.'<sup>lvi</sup>

As its been put by esteemed journalist Mala-

chai O'Doherty The IRA 'declined the opportunity to oppose the British forces coming into the housing estates of west Belfast and Derry' and concludes that the PIRA's 'one and only impressive act of defence was retreat'<sup>lvii</sup>

'apparently Heath is writing his autobiography or something. Where he mentions motor-man was 6 months later after Bloody Sunday. Now what he had, he had a couple of gunboats in the Foyle. He had aircraft ready to strafe Creggan, now that was his mentality six months on. What was his mentality on Bloody Sunday. Ne must a thought every house contained an IRA man.... he actually says that he had a sleepless night before Motorman.<sup>lviii</sup>

Many people say that Bloody Sunday was a massive recruitment officer for the IRA. Motorman for some acted in the same way. , Donncha Mac Ficheallaigh interviewed by Jimmy McGovern

D.McF... I think Motorman, Motorman in a way sort of gave, you the gave you that influx that people contemplating it or whatever or where just getting into it the Motorman factor sort of allowed that group,. the generation you know,.the Bloody Sunday. generation to come forward...<sup>lix</sup>

Gerry Adams in *Before the Dawn* said 'operation motorman failed to destroy the IRA it actually increased recruits.'<sup>lx</sup>

Jack Daw The Queens Regiment - Newline Op Banner Report 'We were briefed to be prepared to take some casualties and gave to fight our way in. We were told to expect the worst, we were expecting at least the barricades to be booby trapped and covered by sniper fire we were expected to fight our way through the barriers.'

Eamon McCann said ' The amount of Hardware and heavy armament that rolled into this area - my first thought was what on earth were they expecting. It confirmed that the british army didn't have a clue about this area. They seemed to think that traditional regiments of the IRA would fight a set piece battle. End of the strategy, (by IRA) that liberated areas would be held.'

As Kearney says in *Long War*; Motorman had an impact it 'Changed from a counter-insurgency to counter terrorism. ' was that the success that was desired?

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liv Denis Bradley interviewed by Jimmy McGovern Ref H/H\_0001

lv *History of the Corps of Royal Engineers Volume XI 1969-1980* Col Mackintosh IRE 1993 p 261

lvi Paddy Ward statement via H2O solicitors Bloody Sunday Inquirey Ref AW/AW\_0008

lvii *The Trouble With Guns: The Trouble With Guns: Republican Strategy and the Provisional IRA* Malachi O'Doherty (The Blackstaff Press, 1998) p88

lviii Joseph Friel - statement to the Bloody Sunday Inquirey Ref: AF/AF\_0034

lix , Donncha Mac Ficheallaigh interviewed by Jimmy McGovern Ref AM/AM\_0007

lx G Adams in *Before the Dawn* London heinemann 1996 p. 210



View of Bridge St and Craigavon Bridge and the Brandywell to the right and just the Bogside at the bottom of the photo RF may be Royal Fusilers Location

# And final word now to John Hume, who spoke to the BBC on the day

“As for the next move from Mr. Whitelaw, I don't know I don't like the move he has made today, I don't think he has been particularly helpful to our position by the move that he has made today in my view we as the representatives of these areas have taken the decision last week, we took two days thoroughly examining it, we believe that a political solution must be found to the problem, there is no military solution from either side, from the British govt side or the PIRA side, we must find a political solution, we have decided on a course of action, I believe that we should not allow the stupidity of the actions of the British government today or the actions of anyone else to deflect us from this course”<sup>ixi</sup>

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ixi BBC John Hume reacts to the British Invasion of two IRA strongholds in Londonderry – the Bogside and Creggan <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00w74xj>



# Enditorial

## **My thoughts, sympathies and condolences are with those who lost their loved ones.**

The history of Derry has been well documented, the focus of this fanzine was Operation Motorman, while a province wide operation this is a specific look at the operation in Derry.

I found it hard, you know. To try and be objective, factual, how can you be objective when it feels just so wrong, I fail to find it justifiable tactically, strategically and then in execution it left a child dead, an innocent man killed, and then the ruthless pointless retribution as a group of nine further innocents in Claudy murdered. All the deaths are covered up, needing years of pressure and persistence from brave families.

To those who fight for truth, thank you for your dedication and diligence.

To those bereft families, my respect and sympathies with what you have had to manage.

I cannot imagine the pain.

For myself, I started this about fourteen years ago now (2023) although my interest was captured earlier. All the places I visited, from the wonderful Bovington Tank Museum, to the Royal Engineers museum in Chatham, to my visit to the Free Derry Museum, to The Imperial War Museum, I received helpful engagement, information, pointers, photocopies, access and help. In fairness a number of times, my softened Irish accent came as a bit of a surprise, my name and London address, and of course email never indicating that I was Irish, caught some off guard, but it always made sense to those who purvey history and the welcome was warm and supportive.

In a number of cases, I hit brick walls. I did start to uncover who was where, and as I sent Cold Calling emails, I realised how unsettling that might be when I got a 'where did you get my email from' response, 'from your work webpage... the one where you mention your career' was my honest reply. It is strange, in one regimental history book it clearly says

they have redacted the names of those in a photo, only for the names to be listed in the actual text. There is too much upset in the world to seek to upset those who followed orders, but I had hoped for insight into what occurred.

The background to Operation Motorman is worthy of a book in its own right. I relied a lot on other voices, seeking quotes from other books, recordings, or to find the voices that spoke of the operation, the records, the words written, and see how it looks when it is brought together. What is it to be accurate? I would be very happy to be told I have something wrong, that there is a fact or element that I have misunderstood, that is in no way a problem to me, as a Fanzine, we can be dynamic and correct an error, or add a page to the PDF, so easily if we find that there is an error.

And there nearly was, I had listened carefully to some testimony in the Imperial War Museum, and transcribed it, and was pleased, and then wondered – is this Operation Huntsman... and found that indeed, it was and caught it.

Thanks have to go to the following places that welcomed me (some a long time ago)

Bovington Tank Museum – Bovington and David Fletcher.

Royal Engineers Museum Chatham

Free Derry Museum – Derry

Imperial War Museum, library and photo archive – London

Irish Army Archive Cathal Brugha Barracks-Dublin

The Fusilier Museum. Moss St – Bury.

The Pat Finucane centre have a huge resource of information, I also found *The Derry Journal*, Eamon McCann, *The Irish Times* and *The Guardian* very useful as reading sources. I am grateful to the journalists who worked for clarity and understanding.

Finally to those at the CAIN Archive - Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland and their amazing archive of information and source material on 'the Troubles' and politics in Northern Ireland from 1968 to the present - Thank you for your amazing work, and to Eamon Meleagh, thank you for letting me use the photos. <https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/>

Thanks to Eugene Doherty and Tommy Ferguson for reading and correcting and input and to Allison Hartman-Adams for the final typo check. Emma J. King for support, and to Christopher J. Garcia as ever, my sincerest gratitude.

To Eamon Melaugh for permission to use his photos - thank you. They are phenomenal.

I have been sent, shared and given photographs, some came from military publications, others I am unsure, if there is any issue with use of any these, used to capture a record, to illustrate this work and time do get in touch. [journeyplanet@gmail.com](mailto:journeyplanet@gmail.com)

## A Brief Note from Chris

Like many of our issues, this one was a long time coming. One thing that I love about *Journey Planet* is we can do deep dives and passion projects like these, and this is definitely a James passion project!

What's next for Team Journey Planet?

That's a question we get a lot, and sometimes we even know! I'm excited for our next colab with Jean Martin looking at Musical Instruments in Myth and Fiction. I've got some great thoughts on that one! I've got some thoughts, but it seems like Bryan Talbot should come soon!

Of course, we're now 15 years old, having launched over Easter 2008, and sooner or later, I'll get *The Compleat Guide to Journey Planet* finished. That's my pasion project.



# Works and Books

Eamon Melaugh, *Derry's Troubled Years*, Guild Hall Press is a wonderful photographic record, and highly recommended. <https://ghpress.com/shop/product/derrys-troubled-years/>

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Christian Tripodi (2018), "An Army of Tribes: British Army Cohesion, Deviancy and Murder in Northern Ireland," *The RUSI Journal*, 163:6, 94-96

David A Charters, "Who ran that war?", *Whose Mission, Whose Orders? British civil-military command and control in Northern Ireland, 1968-1974*

Andrew Sanders, *Operation Motorman (1972) and the search for a coherent British counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland*

Simon Hoggart and Derek Brown, *Guardian* 31<sup>st</sup> July 1972. "Big army push against no-go areas begins"

Stuart Eastwood, *Lions & Dragons: an Illustrated History of the King's Own Royal Border Regiment 1959-2006*

*The Lion and The Dragon: Regimental Gazette of The King's Own Royal Border Regiment*

Kevin Healy <https://www.rte.ie/archives/2017/0627/885955-british-troops-invade-bogside/> (RTÉ reporter reports from 'Free Derry' corner on the movement of British Troops into the Bogside in the early hours of 31 July 1972 and Captain Mike Bond speaks of the 'incursion' from the Creggan.)

IN HER MAJESTY'S COURT OF APPEAL IN NORTHERN IRELAND BEFORE A DIVISIONAL COURT ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (JUDICIAL REVIEW) IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY MARGARET BRADY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW Before: Treacy LJ and Colton J. 28/02/2018. ("The present case began as an application for leave to challenge a decision made on 9 March 2016 by the then Director of Public Prosecutions ("DPP") not to prosecute a soldier ['Soldier B'] for the killing of the applicant's 15 year old brother, Daniel Hegarty, on 31 July 1972.")

[https://www.judiciaryni.uk/sites/judiciary/files/decisions/Brady's%20\(Margaret\)%20Application.pdf](https://www.judiciaryni.uk/sites/judiciary/files/decisions/Brady's%20(Margaret)%20Application.pdf)

Nick Van Der Bijl, *Operation Banner*, 2009.

AW Stephens DS10 "88 Loose Minute, 23/7/1972", in *Contingency Planning: Operation Motorman*, DEFE 24/718, National Archives.

"89 Northern Ireland Contingency Planning 25/7/1972" in *Contingency Planning: Operation Motorman*, DEFE 24/718, National Archives.

Letter from General Sir Michael Carver, Chief of the General Staff, to Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Tuzo, GOC NI 28 July 1972 in *Contingency Planning: Operation Motorman*, DEFE 24/718, National Archives.

"91 Commander Land Forces Directive for Operation Motorman 27/7/1972" in *Contingency Planning: Operation Motorman*, DEFE 24/718, National Archives. 92 Northern Ireland Weekly Intelligence Report 4 August 1972 in *Contingency Planning: Operation Motorman*, DEFE 24/718, National Archives.

Sitrep on Operation Motorman as at 310700 Jul 31/7/1972" in *Contingency Planning: Operation Motorman*, DEFE 24/718, National Archives.

"Northern Ireland Weekly Intelligence Report "4 August 1972 in *Contingency Planning: Operation Motorman*, DEFE 24/718, National Archives.

*Lost Lives: The stories of the men, women and children who died as a result of the Northern Ireland Troubles.* Edited by David MCKittrick, Seamus Keltas, Brian Feeny and Chris Thornton. 1999 Edinburgh, Mainstream Pub. p. 240. 9

"Prime Ministers note: Northern Ireland 31/7/1972" and "Sitrep on Operation Motorman as at 31 July 1972" in *Situation in Northern Ireland* part 25, PREM 15/1011, National Archives.

"Northern Ireland Weekly Intelligence Report 4 August 1972" in *Contingency Planning: Operation Motorman*, DEFE 24/718, National Archives.

Edward Burke *UNDERSTANDING SMALL INFANTRY UNIT BEHAVIOUR AND COHESION: THE CASE OF THE SCOTS GUARDS AND THE ARGYLL AND SUTHERLAND HIGHLANDERS (PRINCESS LOUISE'S) IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1971-1972* <https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/8507/EdwardBurkePhDThesis.pdf?sequence=6>

Capt. R.A. Stewart Bsc The 22<sup>nd</sup> (Cheshire) Regt, *British Army Review Special Report Winter 2019 Urban Operations Vol 2. Urban Guerillas: Origins and prospects.* .<https://www.army.mod.uk/umbraco/Surface/Download/Get/11772>

<https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00w8dzj>

<https://www.derryjournal.com/news/operation-motorman-full-transcript-decision-not-prosecute-soldier-killed-daniel-hegarty-788821>

<https://www.patfinucanecentre.org/state-violence/family-welcome-new-inquest-decision>

*The Fusiler* December 1972 Pages 39, 40, 41.

# Appendix i - Summary of Key Dates and Unit Deployments

Unit	Date of deployment	Based	Role	Notes/comments
1 Coldstream Guards	Arrived 24th July 1972	Based in Creggan	Formed an outer cordon during the operation.	
2 Scots Guards.	Emergency Tour, arrived 27/28th July.	Based in Creggan.	Formed an outer cordon during the operation.	
1 Royal Scots.	Emergency Tour, , departing 6th August.	Based in Fort George	Operated West Side of Creggan during the operation	On 4th Tour since 17th June,
1 Kings Own Borderers		East Side of Creggan		
2 Queens	Arrived 29th July.	Based in Creggan		
3. Royal Regiment of Fusiliers	Emergency Tour, arrived in 13th July, departed 2nd September.		Operated in the Bogside.	
1 Royal Welsh Fusiliers.	Arrived 6th March,	resident at Ebrington Barracks		
2 Light Infantry	Arrived 19th Jun 1972	based in Fort George	Company formed the cordon at the Rosemount and Creggan Start line.	
1 Royal Welsh Fusiliers.	Arrived 6th March	resident at Ebrington Barracks		
2 Light Infantry	Arrived 19th Jun 1972	based in Fort George	Company formed the cordon at the Rosemount and Creggan Start line	
20 Medium Regiment Royal Artillery	On roulement tour, Arrived 7th June	based in Drumahoe	Operated in Creggan	

Unit	Date of deployment	Based	Role	Notes/ comments
2 Royal Green Jackets, Bogside				Not on FOI
B Squadron Royal Horse Guards/ Dragoons RHG/D Blues and Royals.				Not on FOI
7 Field Squadron RE. ,	Arrived July	Ballykelly		
Troop of 26 Armoured Engineer Squadron HQ and Centurion AVREs x 4.	Arrived 30th July.			
Two Troops of 16/5 Lancers				
Troop of 54 Squadron Royal Corps of Transport in APCs				
1 Kings Own Borderers. 14th . .	Jan-76	Ballykinler		
Royal Military Police 176 PRO Coy Londonderry	resident unit 5th Nov 1971	Resident Unit		
2 Field Hospital.	29th July 1972 Departed 8th August.			for Operation Motorman

# Appendix ii: Deaths in July 1972

I must credit Malcolm Sutton who steadfastly and stoically compiled a list of those killed in the Troubles, so that they could be remembered, and M. Meleugh and the CAIN as vital resources in regards to this list. I collate their work here in respect.

Details are available here: <https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/sutton/chron/1972.html>

01 July 1972 Paul Jobling (19) English Civilian killed by Loyalists (L)  
01 July 1972 Daniel Hayes (40) Catholic Civilian killed by Loyalists (L)  
02 July 1972 Hugh Clawson (39) Protestant Civilian killed by Republicans  
02 July 1972 David Fisher (30) Protestant Civilian Killed by Republicans  
02 July 1972 McCrea, Gerard (27) Catholic Civilian Killed by Loyalists  
02 July 1972 James Howell (31) Catholic Civilian Killed by Loyalists  
03 July 1972 John O'Hanlon (38) Catholic Civilian, Killed by: Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)  
05 July 1972 Malcom Orr (20) Protestant: Civilian, Killed by Unknown  
05 July 1972 Peter Orr (19) Protestant Civilian, Killed by Unknown  
07 July 1972 Samuel Robinson (19) Protestant Civilian, Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)  
.08 July 1972 Laurence McKenna, Laurence (22) Catholic Civilian Killed by UVF  
09 July 1972 Joesph Flemming (30) Catholic British Army Territorial Army (TA), Killed by: Republicans  
09 July 1972 Brian McMillan, Brian (21) Protestant Civilian, Killed by: Republicans  
09 July 1972 Alan Meehan (18) Protestant Civilian Killed by: Republicans  
09 July 1972 David Andrews (31) Protestant Civilian Killed by: Republicans  
09 July 1972 Angelo Flonda (60) Catholic Civilian, Killed by: British Army  
09 July 1972 Patrick Butler, Patrick (38) Catholic, Civilian, Killed by: British Army  
09 July 1972 Fr. Noel Fitzpatrick, Noel (40) Catholic Civilian Killed by: British Army  
09 July 1972 Margaret Gargan (13) Catholic Civilian Killed by: British Army  
09 July 1972 John Dougal (16) Catholic Irish Republican Army Youth Section (IRAF), Killed by: British Army  
09 July 1972 David McCafferty, David (15) Catholic Official Irish Republican Army Youth Section (OIRAF), Killed by: British Army  
09 July 1972 Gerald Turkington, Gerald (32) Protestant Ulster Defence Association (UDA), Killed by: Irish Republican Army  
11 July 1972 Gerard Gibson, (16) Catholic Official Irish Republican Army Youth Section (OIRAF), Killed by: British Army  
11 July 1972 Charles Watson (21) Catholic Civilian (Civ), Killed by Loyalists  
11 July 1972 Terrance Jones, Terence (23) British Army (BA), Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)  
12 July 1972 Paul Beatie (19) Protestant Civilian killed by REpublicans

22 July 1972 Patrick O'Neill, Patrick (26) Catholic Civilian Killed by: Ulster Defence Association (UDA)  
22 July 1972 Francis Arthurs (34) Catholic Civilian (Civ), Killed by: Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)  
23 July 1972 Robert McComb (22) Protestant British Army Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)  
24 July 1972 James Casey (57) Catholic Civilian (Civ), Killed by: British Army (BA)  
24 July 1972 Frederick Maguire (56) Protestant Civilian Killed by: Ulster Defence Association (UDA)  
24 July 1972 Thomas, Brian (20) British Army Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)  
25 July 1972 James Kenna (19) Protestant Ulster Defence Association (UDA), Killed by: Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA)  
26 July 1972 David Allen (22) British Army (BA), Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)  
26 July 1972 Francis Corr (52) Catholic Civilian Killed by: Ulster Defence Association (UDA)  
26 July 1972 James McGerty (26) Catholic Civilian (Civ), Killed by: Ulster Defence Association (UDA)  
27 July 1972 Francis McStravick (42) Catholic Civilian, Killed by: Ulster Defence Association (UDA)  
28 July 1972 Seamus Cassidy (22) Catholic Irish Republican Army (IRA), Killed by: British Army (BA)  
28 July 1972 Phillip Maguire (55) Catholic Civilian Killed by: Loyalists  
29 July 1972 Daniel Dunne (19) Catholic Civilian Killed by: Ulster Defence Association (UDA)  
30 July 1972 William McAfee, William (54) Protestant Civilian Killed by Loyalists  
31 July 1972 Daniel Hegarty (15) Catholic Civilian Killed by: British Army  
31 July 1972 Seamus Bradley, Seamus (19) Catholic Irish Republican Army (IRA), Killed by: British Army  
31 July 1972 Kathryn Eakin (8) Protestant Civilian Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)  
31 July 1972 James McClelland (65) Protestant Civilian Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)  
31 July 1972 David Miller (60) Protestant Civilian Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)  
31 July 1972 Elizabeth McElhinney (59) Catholic Civilian Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)  
31 July 1972 Joseph McCloskey (38) Catholic Civilian Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)  
31 July 1972 William Temple, (16) Protestant Civilian Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)  
31 July 1972 Rose McLaughlin (52) Catholic Civilian Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)  
31 July 1972 Joseph Connolly (15) Catholic Civilian Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)  
31 July 1972 Arthur Hone, Arthur (38) Catholic Civilian (Civ), Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)



12 July 1972 Jack McCabe (48) Catholic Civilian Killed by: Ulster Defence Association (UDA)

12 July 1972 William Cochrane (53) Protestant Civilian Killed by: Ulster Defence Association (UDA)

12 July 1972 David McClenaghan (15) Catholic Civilian (Civ), Killed by: c Loyalists

12 July 1972 Colin Poots, Colin (21) Protestant Civilian killed by Republicans

13 July 1972 Martin Rooney (22) British Army Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

13 July 1972 Kenneth Mogg (29) British Army, Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

13 July 1972 David Meeke (24) British Army (BA), Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

13 July 1972 Henry Russell (23) Catholic - British Army Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), Killed by Loyalists.

13 July 1972 Thomas Burns (35) Catholic Civilian Killed by: British Army

13 July 1972 James Reid (27) Catholic Irish Republican Army (IRA), Killed by: British Army

13 July 1972 Terence Toolan (36) Catholic Civilian (Civ), Killed by: British Army

14 July 1972 Louis Scullion (27) Catholic Irish Republican Army (IRA), Killed by: British Army

14 July 1972 Robert Williams-Wynn (24) : British Army (BA), Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

14 July 1972 Peter Heppenstall (20): British Army, Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

14 July 1972 Jane McIntyre (64) Protestant Civilian Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

14 July 1972 Edward Brady (30) Catholic Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA), Killed by: British Army (BA)

14 July 1972 John Williams, John (22) British Army (BA), Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

15 July 1972 Felix Hughes (35) Catholic Civilian (Civ), Killed by: Ulster Defence Association (UDA)

15 July 1972 John Young (27) British Army (BA), Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

15 July 1972 John Mooney (17) Catholic Civilian, Killed by: British Army (BA)

15 July 1972 Kenneth Canham (24) British Army Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

16 July 1972 Terrence Graham (24) British Army Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

16 July 1972 James Lee, James (25) British Army, Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

16 July 1972 Robert Laverty (18) Protestant Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

16 July 1972 Tobias Molloy (18) Catholic Irish Republican Army Youth Section (IRAF), Killed by: British Army

16 July 1972 Francis McKeown (43) Catholic Civilian (Civ), Killed by: British Army

18 July 1972 James Jones (18) Status: British Army Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

18 July 1972 Thomas Mills (56) Protestant Civilian Killed by: British Army

19 July 1972 Henry Gray (71) Protestant Civilian Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

19 July 1972 Alan Jack (0) Protestant Civilian Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

19 July 1972 Hugh Wright (21) Protestant Civilian Killed by Loyalists

20 July 1972 Robert Leggett (50) Protestant Civilian Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

21 July 1972 Anthony Davidson, (21) Catholic: Civilian (Civ), Killed by Loyalists

21 July 1972 Stephen Cooper (19) British Army Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

21 July 1972 Phillip Price (27) British Army Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

21 July 1972 William Crothers (15) Protestant Civilian Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

21 July 1972 William Irvine (18) Protestant Ulster Defence Association (UDA), Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

21 July 1972 Thomas Killops (39) Protestant Civilian Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

21 July 1972 Jackie Gibson (45) Protestant Civilian, Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

21 July 1972 Margaret O'Hare (34) Catholic Civilian Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

21 July 1972 Brigid Murray (65) Catholic Civilian Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

21 July 1972 Stephen Parker (14) Protestant Civilian Killed by: Irish Republican Army (IRA)

21 July 1972 Joseph Rosato (59) Catholic Civilian, Killed by Loyalists

21 July 1972 Joseph Downey (23) Catholic Irish Republican Army (IRA), Killed by: British Army

22 July 1972 Rosemary McCartney, (27) Catholic Civilian Killed by: Ulster Defence Association (UDA)